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BOOKS AND OLIVE OIL: WHY ANTITRUST MUST DEAL 
WITH CONSOLIDATED CORPORATE POWER
Carl T. Bogus*
ABSTRACT†
Following an epic battle in the marketplace between Apple and major book 
publishers, on one side, and Amazon, on the other side, the United States
Department of Justice and thirty-three states filed an antitrust lawsuit against 
Apple and the publishers, alleging that they had conspired to fix the prices of 
ebooks. Both the district court and a divided panel of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit decided the case in the government’s favor. This 
Article argues that government regulators and the courts took the wrong side in the 
dispute and did so because of fundamental flaws in current antitrust policy. 
Adhering to the standard approach, regulators and the courts ignored unique 
aspects of the industry and treated books just as they would have treated cans of 
olive oil. Focusing exclusively on consumer welfare—that is, consumer prices and 
total industry output—regulators and the courts ignored critical social, cultural, 
and political ramifications of the dispute. Moreover, the widely accepted view that 
business firms are rational profit maximizers led regulators and the courts into 
making serious factual misjudgments. Although there are many calls for antitrust 
reform, most are limited to calls for more rigorous application of existing doctrine. 
This case study demonstrates why that is inadequate and a paradigm shift in 
antitrust policy is required.
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INTRODUCTION
In a scene in the movie You’ve Got Mail, Kathleen Kelly accuses 
Joe Fox of comparing books to cans of olive oil.1 As those who have 
seen this wonderful romantic comedy will remember, Kelly, played 
by Meg Ryan, is the owner of an independent children’s bookshop, 
and Fox, played by Tom Hanks, is an owner of a chain of book su-
perstores that can afford to discount. When Fox opens a superstore 
near Kelly’s small shop, he presents an existential threat to her 
business. Fighting for survival, Kelly gives an interview to a local 
television station. “I have to say, I have met Joe Fox, and I have 
heard him compare his store to a price club and the books in it to 
cans of olive oil,” she tells the reporter.2
It was no accident that screenwriters Nora and Delia Ephron 
chose to make the struggle between Joe Fox and Kathleen Kelly 
about how books are presented and sold to the public. Books are 
special. They help elevate people from materialistic, self-centered 
beings into something more: creatures who create, preserve, and 
transmit knowledge; who are carried to imaginary lands by litera-
ture; and who ponder the meaning of existence. Books not only 
enrich individual lives but play a critical role in democracy for, as 
André Schiffrin put it, “[i]t is only in books that arguments and in-
quiries can be conducted at length and in depth.”3 It was not by 
chance that the screenwriters chose to make Kathleen Kelly’s Shop 
Around the Corner a children’s bookshop where Kelly regularly 
1. YOU’VE GOT MAIL (Warner Brothers 1998).
2. Id.
3. ANDRÉ SCHIFFRIN, THE BUSINESS OF BOOKS: HOW INTERNATIONAL CONGLOMERATES 
TOOK OVER PUBLISHING AND CHANGED THE WAY WE READ 171 (2000). Schriffrin headed 
Pantheon Books for twenty-eight years before founding The New Press.
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reads to enthralled children and knowledgeably recommends 
books that will stimulate their imagination and love of learning.
In comparing books to olive oil, Joe Fox was not, in fact, denying 
the special importance of books; he was merely suggesting that 
there is nothing unique about the economics of books.4 Consum-
ers benefit from lower prices for all products, and the laws of eco-
nomics—such as economies of scale—apply just as much to selling 
books as to selling cans of olive oil. We may have nostalgic memo-
ries of the small bookstore we patronized long ago, but it makes no 
more sense to resist Fox Books in favor of the Shop Around the 
Corner than it did to resist the modern supermarket in favor of the 
mom-and-pop grocer.5 Times change; the marketplace decides.
That was Joe Fox’s argument.
At first, the audience sympathizes with Kathleen Kelly, but by the 
end of the film the audience realizes the issue is complex. Fox 
Books provides many things that Kelly’s small store could not: low-
er prices, greater selection, comfortable chairs in which to relax 
and look at books, and a coffee shop with cappuccinos. On the 
other hand, Kelly’s shop was not merely a business; it was a labor of 
love. Kelly was a connoisseur of children’s literature and knew her 
customers. She could recommend just the book for any child’s 
current interest and stage of development.
In the twenty years since You’ve Got Mail, the one constant in 
book distribution has been continuous, unpredictable change. 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, about half of all independent 
bookstores went out of business as customers flocked to the Fox 
Books of the world.6 At the moment, independent bookstores are
making at least a minor comeback.7 Now chain superstores may be 
4. Actually, Kathleen Kelly was mistaken. Joe Fox never compared his store to a price 
club or books to cans of olive oil. Rather, Fox had accused Kelly of assuming he sold books 
as if they were cans of olive oil. YOU’VE GOT MAIL (Warner Brothers 1998).
5. A century ago, there was just such a movement to hold back supermarkets and pro-
tect these small businesses. See generally MARC LEVINSON, THE GREAT A&P AND THE STRUGGLE 
FOR SMALL BUSINESS IN AMERICA (2011).
6. In 1991, there were 5,100 members of the American Booksellers Association (which 
may be the best metric of the number of independent booksellers because ABA member-
ship does not include pharmacies, convenience stores, department stores, and other retail-
ers that carry books within a much broader inventory). JOHN B. THOMPSON, MERCHANTS OF 
CULTURE: THE PUBLISHING BUSINESS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 31–32 (2d ed. 2012). By 
2009, that number had fallen to 1,401. See Number of Independent Bookstores in the United States 
from 2009 to 2017, STATISTA (last visited Oct. 11, 2018), http://www.statista.com/statistics/
282808/number-of-independent-bookstores-in-the-us/.
7. As of 2016, there are 1,775 companies operating independent bookstores. Number of 
Independent Bookstores in the United States from 2009 to 2017, STATISTA (last visited Oct. 11, 
2018), http://www.statista.com/statistics/282808/number-of-independent-bookstores-in-
the-us/. While the present number of independent booksellers is less than thirty-five per-
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an endangered species. Borders, which had been the second larg-
est superstore chain, went out of business in 2011.8 Barnes & Noble 
remains, but it is closing stores and laying off employees, and in-
dustry analysts are debating whether it will survive.9 The dominant 
bookseller in the United States is Amazon. Amazon accounts for 
more than forty percent of all of the books sold in the United 
States—hardback, paperback, and electronic—and two-thirds of all 
ebooks.10 That is how things stand right now. No one can say what 
the market will look like in five years.
This Article deals with an epic battle that Apple and five book 
publishers waged against Amazon in late 2009 and early 2010. At 
that time, Amazon was selling ninety percent of all ebooks in 
America. It was, moreover, protecting its de facto monopoly by sell-
ing the most popular ebooks—new releases and bestsellers—below 
cost, thereby deterring potential rivals from entering the market. 
Apple wanted to open an ebook store for its new iPad customers, 
but it did not want to do so at a loss. Apple and the publishers 
agreed on a new pricing model that effectively ended below-cost 
pricing by all ebook retailers. Amazon complained to the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) that Apple and the publishers had con-
spired to fix prices and to force Amazon to raise its pricing to the 
prescribed level. In April 2012, the United States and thirty-three 
states filed a complaint in federal court, alleging that Apple and 
the book publishers had engaged in unreasonable restraints of 
trade, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.11 The publish-
ers settled and entered into consent decrees. The case proceeded 
to trial against Apple alone. Following a three-week bench trial, 
District Judge Denise Cote issued a seventy-page opinion in the 
cent of what it was in 1991, the number has risen modestly each year for the past seven years.
Id.; THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 31–32.
8. Borders, which had eighty-five superstores in 1994, filed for bankruptcy and closed 
all of its stores in 2011. THOMPSON supra note 6, at 30. Meanwhile, the number of Barnes & 
Noble stores has declined each year from 2008 to 2015. See Number of Barnes & Noble stores 
from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2018, STATISTA (last visited Oct. 11, 2018), http://
www.statista.com/statistics/199012/number-of-barnes-noble-stores-by-type-and-year-since-
2005/.
9. See, e.g., Casey Quackenbush, Barnes & Noble Is Laying Off Workers Amid Declining 
Sales, FORTUNE (Feb. 13, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/02/13/barnes-noble-layoff-
workers-declining-sales; How Can Barnes & Noble Avoid Borders’ Fate? KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON
(Dec. 18, 2015), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/can-barnes-noble-avoid-
borders-fate/.
10. Franklin Foer, Amazon Must Be Stopped, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 27, 2014, at 20.
11. United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 791 F.3d 290 
(2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1376 (2016).
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government’s favor.12 Apple appealed, a divided panel of the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
As this Article will show, the government and the courts took the 
wrong side in this dispute. In siding with Amazon, they sided with a 
firm that had a monopoly and was preserving that position 
through predatory practices. Instead of addressing this monopoly, 
they punished the parties that sought to break it up. And it is even 
worse than that. Amazon was threatening to extend its monopoly 
in the retailing of ebooks into a monopoly in the retailing of all
books. The economic consequences of that would be dire, but the 
political and cultural ramifications of having a single retailer of all 
books in the United States would be far worse. If that came to pass, 
one firm could decide which books to promote—through homep-
age displays, search engine results, recommendations, and other-
wise—and which books to make inconspicuous.
All of this should have been obvious to the experienced attor-
neys in the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
and the capable federal judges who handled this case. Yet, it was 
not. Why? This Article attempts to answer that question.
Although this Article uses books as a case study, it is about much 
more than books. The principal objective is not to show that regu-
lators and courts reached the wrong result in this one case, as im-
portant as the case was. Rather, building on an argument I have 
previously advanced,13 I use this case to illustrate why we need a 
paradigm shift in antitrust law. Under the current paradigm, anti-
trust is concerned exclusively with consumer welfare: What causes 
consumer prices to rise is bad, and what causes them to fall is 
good.14 Everything else is largely ignored.15 This blinkered view led 
regulators and judges astray in the Amazon case. Because they had 
12. The plaintiffs in the lawsuit were the federal government and thirty-three states, but
the U.S. Department of Justice took the lead for all plaintiffs in the litigation. For simplici-
ty’s sake, therefore, when referring to the plaintiffs, this Article generally uses the singular 
term “government.”
13. Carl T. Bogus, The New Road to Serfdom: The Curse of Bigness and the Failure of Antitrust,
49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 (2015) [hereinafter Bogus, The New Road to Serfdom]; see also Carl 
T. Bogus, Trust-Busting: Labor’s Forgotten Cause, 26 NEW LAB. F. 46 (2017) (expanding on as-
pects of the central thesis involving worker freedom and wages).
14. In theory, total industry output is even more important than consumer prices, but 
prices and output are considered inextricably interlinked: When prices rise, output falls and 
vice versa. Thus, focusing on prices automatically embraces output. See infra note 383 and 
accompanying text.
15. While in theory consumer welfare includes product variety, quality, and innovation, 
these considerations are generally given little, if any, weight. See, e.g., Rebecca Haw Al-
lensworth, The Commensurability Myth in Antitrust, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1, 56 (2016); Robert H. 
Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 503, 525 (2001).
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become accustomed to thinking of low prices as antitrust law’s
North Star, the Department of Justice and the courts overlooked 
the fact that Amazon’s prices had been too low. Those prices had 
not been set through marketplace competition, nor did they re-
flect the cost of production. They were below-cost prices, artificially 
suppressed for predatory purposes. Additional fundamental prob-
lems with the existing paradigm complicated matters. This para-
digm—heavily influenced by the Chicago School of law and eco-
nomics—prefers logic to experience.16 Its fundamental principles 
are assumptions, which it treats as axioms, and from which it de-
duces further principles and rules and even makes factual deter-
minations about what parties intended. Its most basic principle is 
the assumption that people and businesses are rational maximiz-
ers.17 That assumption subtly convinced the regulators and courts 
that the publishers must have been acting to increase short-term 
profits, and it made them incredulous that the publishers actually 
accepted lower profits to destroy Amazon’s chokehold over 
ebooks.
The courts did just what Kathleen Kelly accused Joe Fox of do-
ing—treating books just as they would have treated cans of olive oil 
or any other commodity. This approach flows naturally from a sys-
tem that attempts to employ universal axioms. But, books are not 
olive oil. The current antitrust paradigm employs a cookbook ap-
proach to antitrust. As a result, the regulators and courts failed to 
consider not only unique aspects of books themselves, but special 
features of the business of book publishing and distribution. And 
most importantly, by focusing exclusively on consumer welfare, 
government regulators and the courts overlooked critically im-
portant social, cultural, and political issues, including what it would 
mean for American democracy if one firm can effectively deter-
mine which books are read.
Books, of course, are unique and have unique importance. This 
Article does not argue, however, that because books are unique, a 
different set of antitrust rules must be developed for them. This 
Article argues that—with respect to all products and industries—
antitrust should not be concerned with consumer welfare alone. It 
should also be concerned with social and political consequences of 
consolidated corporate power, and to do that, it is necessary to un-
derstand the special features of the particular industry involved. All 
16. See infra notes 375–80 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 378–79 and accompanying text.
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industries have their own special features. In this particular case, 
the industry was books, and it is necessary to learn a bit about the 
book business to understand the ramifications of consolidated 
power in that industry. Justice Louis D. Brandeis advocated for this 
approach and began every problem by intensively examining the 
facts.18 He considered this so important, he believed that law 
schools should teach “that lawyers should not merely learn rules of 
law” but should also study the “facts, human, industrial, social, to 
which they are to be applied.”19 This approach is precisely not what 
the regulators and courts did in this case. The objective is not to 
condemn them, however; it is to show how currently-accepted anti-
trust thinking misled them and why a new antitrust paradigm must 
emerge.
Part I of this Article will, therefore, be about the business of 
book publishing and retailing. It is organized by describing, in 
turn, the parties in the three-way struggle between six book pub-
lishers, Amazon, and Apple. This organization allows a more or less 
chronological description of the book industry, the commercial 
and cultural context in which the Amazon dispute arose, and the 
underlying events. Part II will describe and critique the opinions by 
the district and circuit courts in the case. This Part will show how 
the courts could have reached the opposite result under existing 
doctrine. By doing so, I hope to demonstrate that even though we 
need a paradigm shift in antitrust doctrine, that does not mean 
that all antitrust doctrine, developed over more than a century, will 
suddenly be irrelevant. What matters most of all is a fundamental 
shift of worldview. Rather than having the single North Star of con-
sumer welfare, antitrust must take into account other values. That 
shift will enable regulators and courts to apply many existing rules 
and principles more wisely. Part III will provide a more direct ar-
gument for why antitrust must be concerned first and foremost 
with consolidated corporate power and what that means. A brief 
Conclusion follows.
I. THE BOOK INDUSTRY
There were no Lilliputians in this dispute. This was a three-way 
contest involving the six largest book publishers, the largest book 
18. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 130, 157 (2009).
19. Id. at 209 (quoting Brandeis); see also JEFFREY ROSEN, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, AMERICAN 
PROPHET 89–90 (2016).
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retailer, and another large firm that wanted to enter the book re-
tailing business. There were, nevertheless, significant disparities of 
power. One combatant, Amazon, had enormous market power in 
book retailing generally and a monopoly in one segment of that 
market, namely, ebooks. It protected that monopoly by selling be-
low cost; and if the monopoly lasted long enough, it might become 
irreversible. All of this presented an existential threat to a second 
group of combatants, the book publishers. A battle ensued when 
another combatant, Apple, decided to enter the market—but only 
if it could demolish the existing system. Most importantly, the pub-
lic had an enormous stake in the outcome of that battle.
A. The Publishers
At the time of the dispute, there were six major trade book pub-
lishers in the United States.20 Together these six firms published 
roughly two-thirds of all books sold in the United States.21 All six 
had been built through numerous mergers and acquisitions over a 
period of decades, and each published books under many different 
imprints. Random House, for example, published books under at 
least two dozen imprints, including Anchor, Alfred A. Knopf, 
Crown, Doubleday, Pantheon, and Vintage, all of which had once 
been the names of independent firms.22 The other five major pub-
lishers were The Hachette Group,23 HarperCollins,24 MacMillan,25
The Penguin Group,26and Simon & Schuster.27 Random House and 
20. This Article generally focuses on trade book publishers, that is, firms that publish 
general interest books, fiction or nonfiction, for profit. Trade publishers can be distin-
guished from academic publishers, who are typically non-profit enterprises subsidized to 
some extent by universities or specialty publishers for religious, educational, or medical 
books. These distinctions are generally accurate even though there are not always clear lines 
between the categories. Academic publishers may be expected to be financially self-sufficient 
or even profitable, for example, and The Free Press may be classified as a trade publisher 
even though it is a non-profit company.
21. Boris Kachka, Book Publishing’s Big Gamble, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2013, at A21.
22. THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 410; Imprints of Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group,
http://knopfdoubleday.com/imprints/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2018).
23. Hachette published books in the United States under at least seventeen imprints, 
including Little, Brown & Company, Springboard Press, and Twelve. THOMPSON, supra note 
6, at 412.
24. HarperCollins published books in the United States under at least twenty-three im-
prints, including Ecco, Harper, and William Morrow. Id. at 412–13.
25. McMillan’s formal corporate name was Holzbrinck Publishers. It published books 
in the United States under at least nineteen imprints, including Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 
Henry Holt, Hill & Wang, and St. Martin’s Press. Id. at 413.
26. The Penguin Group published books in the United States under at least thirty im-
prints, including G.P. Putnam’s Sons, Grosset & Dunlap, Putnam, and Viking. Id. at 411.
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Penguin have since merged, reducing the Big Six publishing hous-
es to a Big Five.28 A brief history of how these companies were as-
sembled helps illuminate the unique features of book publishing.
In the first half of the twentieth century, book publishing was 
populated by dozens of relatively small, independent firms.29 Some 
were family businesses. Many were owned entirely, or at least in 
significant part, by their top executives, who were a rather special, 
self-selected group.30 These executives were, to be sure, business-
men interested in making a profit, but most had chosen book pub-
lishing—rather than, say, olive oil cannery—because they loved 
books and considered publishing something of a public-interest 
endeavor as well as a business.31 The salaries of publishers were 
traditionally closer to those of university professors than executives 
in other industries.32 Firms occasionally merged during this period. 
Most mergers occurred because executives of two firms had similar 
views about what they wanted to publish, had compatible title and 
author lists, and thought a combined firm would have greater pres-
tige.33
Beginning in the early 1960s, things changed.
Along with other sectors of the economy, publishers began to 
pursue mergers aggressively.34 Although the merger trend has con-
tinued unabated ever since, there have been distinctly different 
merger waves. The first wave occurred because media conglomer-
27. Simon & Schuster published books in the United States under at least ten imprints, 
including Free Press, Pocket Books, Scribner, and Touchstone. Id. at 413.
28. Id. at 410–14; Julie Bosman, Penguin and Random House Merge, Saying Change Will 
Come Slowly, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/02/business/
media/merger-of-penguin-and-random-house-is-completed.html.
29. THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 102.
30. See id.
31. André Schiffrin, for example, says that in the 1960s, he and his colleagues at Pan-
theon had “the conviction that we were participating in a common enterprise of shared cul-
tural and political value.” SCHIFFRIN, supra note 3, at 54. Bennett Cerf describes how, as a 
young man, he moved from a Wall Street brokerage firm to a small book publishing house, 
motivated by loving books and being star-struck by famous authors. BENNETT CERF, AT
RANDOM: THE REMINISCENCES OF BENNETT CERF 25–28 (2d ed. 2002). Two years later, Cerf 
formed a partnership with a friend, Donald Klopfer, who also loved books. Id. at 54–55.
Throughout their memoirs, both Schiffrin and Cerf recount with pride examples of books 
that they published, even though they knew that they would not be profitable, because they 
considered them to be socially important works.
32. SCHIFFRIN, supra note 3, at 120.
33. For example, see Bennett Cerf’s description of Random House’s first acquisition, 
namely, the firm of Smith and Haas in 1936. CERF, supra note 31, at 123.
34. THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 103–08. A catalyst for the first merger waves was that 
some of the larger publishers decided to go public. Both Random House and Penguin be-
came public companies in 1961. See CERF, supra note 31, at 284; THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 
119–20.
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ates decided that book publishing offered synergies with their oth-
er corporate divisions. In 1965, Time-Life and Random House be-
came interested in merging.35 The principal rationale was that 
Time-Life, which published magazines for affluent subscribers, had 
a mail order list that could be used effectively to market Random 
House books. The companies abandoned the potential deal be-
cause informal discussions with the Department of Justice suggest-
ed that the government would oppose the merger on antitrust 
grounds. Very quickly thereafter, RCA acquired Random House. 
The deal was based on the rationale that Random House’s text-
book division could provide content for teaching machines to be 
developed by RCA.36 During the same period, Viacom, which 
owned Paramount Pictures among other properties, acquired Si-
mon & Shuster, and the Los Angeles Times Mirror Company ac-
quired The New American Library.37
All of those corporate marriages ended in divorce. One of the 
principal reasons that these mergers failed is that the promised 
synergies never materialized.38 That problem is not unique to 
books; throughout the corporate world the vision of merger syner-
gies often turns out to be a mirage.39 However, the mergers also 
failed for a more industry-specific reason. Book publishing is a low 
profit-margin industry. Traditionally, book publishers make a four 
to eight percent profit.40 The conglomerates thought that, in addi-
tion to increasing profitability through synergies, they could in-
crease profit margins by introducing more modern business prac-
tices to the stodgy world of book publishing.41
35. For descriptions of both the discussions between Time-Life and Random House 
and RCA’s subsequent acquisition of Random House, see THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 106–
07; CERF, supra note 31, at 285–87.
36. SCHIFFRIN, supra note 3, at 74.
37. See id. at 47–48, 70. Similar dynamics were at play in Great Britain, too. In 1970, the 
British conglomerate Pearson PLC acquired Penguin Books. Id. at 47. That merger did last 
however.
38. John B. Thompson writes that the merging partners discovered that “‘teaching ma-
chines’ were a figment of the technological imagination at the dawn of the digital revolu-
tion,” and that movie rights did not automatically follow publication rights but were re-
tained for separate sale by writers’ agents. THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 107.
39. See, e.g., Edward A. Blackstone & Joseph P. Fuhr Jr., Failed Hospital Mergers, 36 J.
HEALTH L. 301, 302–03 (2003); James A. Fanto, Quasi-Rationality in Action: A Study of Psycho-
logical Factors in Merger Decision-Making, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1333, 1334–35, 1368–72 (2001); 
James A. Fanto, Breaking the Merger Momentum: Reforming Corporate Law Governing Mega-
Mergers, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 249, 255 (2001).
40. See SCHIFFRIN, supra note 3, at 118 (suggesting that the typical profit margin is 
around four percent); THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 149 (suggesting that six to eight percent 
is typical and three to four percent is not uncommon).
41. THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 107.
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Once book publishers found themselves part of corporate con-
glomerates, they found themselves subjected to pressure to acquire 
other publishing firms. Rapid growth and fat profit margins are 
highly desired by large corporations because investors are con-
stantly looking for high-performance stocks. The easiest way to 
grow quickly is by buying other companies; it is much more diffi-
cult to grow by outperforming rivals. But mergers can be a short-
term fix because investor focus immediately turns to the profit 
margin of the combined entity, and for reasons we will turn to 
shortly, the traditionally low profit-margins of book publishers 
turned out to be more durable than the acquirers imagined.
A second wave of mergers started in the late 1970s. For the most 
part, a different set of corporations purchased the book publishers. 
In 1987, Rupert Murdoch’s News Limited, which also owned news-
papers, purchased Harper & Row.42 Two years later, the Newhouse 
family, which owned newspapers and magazines, purchased Ran-
dom House from RCA.43 Meanwhile, the French firm Hachette be-
gan purchasing book publishers.44 The main objective in this wave 
was to achieve efficiencies through consolidations, and therefore 
the parent companies also purchased other book publishers.45
Shortly after buying Random House, for example, the Newhouse 
family purchased Crown Books,46 and Murdoch’s firm purchased 
the British book publisher William Collins & Sons.47 This second 
wave continues unabated to the present day. Imprints and entire 
publishing groups are bought and sold in what seems like a never-
ending game of musical chairs—so much so that even people in 
the industry have a difficult time knowing who owns what at any 
given time. Meanwhile, the trend toward greater consolidation has 
been relentless.
But consolidation has not changed one basic fact about trade 
book publishing: It is an industry with relatively thin profit mar-
gins. Economies of scale may have increased profit margins to 
some extent. It appears that when firms were independent, profit 
42. SCHIFFRIN, supra note 3, at 69; Company Profile, HARPERCOLLINS PUBLISHERS, http://
corporate.harpercollins.com/about-us/company-profile (last visited Oct. 27, 2018).
43. Id. at 77–81.
44. THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 121–24.
45. See id. at 108–18, 379–83.
46. SCHIFFRIN, supra note 3, at 80.
47. Company Profile, supra note 42.
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margins were traditionally in the four to five percent range.48 By 
consolidating some functions, such as printing, warehousing, dis-
tribution, accounting, sales forces, and negotiations with major re-
tailers, the now-larger publishing groups reduced overhead and 
increased profit margins to some extent.49 Nevertheless, profit 
margins are most often in the six to eight percent range, and mar-
gins of three to four percent are still not uncommon.50 Dreams of 
profit margins of twelve to fifteen percent have proved elusive.51
Why is it so difficult to achieve larger profit margins in trade 
book publishing? First, it is an industry with significant costs. Repu-
table trade presses invest considerable time and money on every 
book they publish. Each book goes through at least two separate 
edits, first for content and then for typographical and grammatical 
errors, syntax, and style. The publisher also designs the dustjacket 
and promotes the book with book review editors and retailers. Fi-
nally, publishers experience significant costs in returns, that is, un-
sold books that retailers return for credit.52
The publisher also pays the author an advance against royal-
ties.53 Authors generally receive royalties of fifteen percent on the 
retail price on hardcover books. Advances, however, are nonre-
fundable so that if an advance is not “earned out,” that is, if the 
book does not sell well enough for the author to fully earn the ad-
vance, the author benefits at the publisher’s expense. Agents for 
brand name authors negotiate large advances, making the profita-
bility of even these books uncertain. One larger publisher estimat-
ed that as a result of all of these pressures, the actual split of net 
revenues is a ratio somewhere around 75/25 or 80/20 in favor of 
the author.
48. See SCHIFFRIN, supra note 3, at 119 (stating that conglomerate profit margin targets 
were in the twelve to fifteen percent range, which was “three to four times what publishing 
houses have made in the past”).
49. THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 148–52.
50. Id. at 149.
51. When it purchased Random House in 1998, the German firm Bertelsmann predict-
ed that Random House (which already included Bantam, Doubleday, Dell, and other im-
prints) would achieve a fifteen percent profit margin, and corporate targets are generally 
for-profit margins in the twelve to fifteen percent range. SCHIFFRIN, supra note 3, at 115, 119.
Nevertheless, profit margins have proved to be “stubbornly low,” and profit margins of ten 
percent are exceptional. THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 107, 149.
52. Retailers tend to order more copies of a new book than they wind up selling, and if 
a title is not moving, retailers will pack up and return its unsold inventory within ninety days 
or so. The rate of return for new books by trade publishers generally runs around forty-five 
percent. THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 285.
53. This discussion of royalties and the effective split of net revenues between publisher 
and author is drawn from THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 216–17.
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The revenue side of the ledger is equally difficult because no 
one has found a way to reliably predict which books will be profita-
ble. There are some exceptions to this general rule. If an author, 
such as George R.R. Martin or David McCullough, has an estab-
lished fan base, sales of that author’s previous books can be a rea-
sonable predictor of how the author’s next book will do.54 Beyond 
that, publishing executives—no matter how experienced and sav-
vy—can only make uncertain guesses about what will sell.55
Working in an industry with small profit margins was acceptable 
to many people who traditionally went into book publishing be-
cause they knew that, while they were unlikely to become wealthy, 
they could eke out a reasonably comfortable living in an endeavor 
they loved and found gratifying. They hoped for the occasional 
bestseller, but their bread and butter were books that were moder-
ate successes—books that would turn a profit by selling 10,000 cop-
ies and wind up selling 30,000 copies. Further, books that contin-
ued to sell a few hundred copies every year for ten or even thirty 
years on the publisher’s backlist provided financial ballast.56
The consolidation of publishers has not changed the hard reali-
ties of the business. It has, nevertheless, changed attitudes. Consol-
idation created much larger firms, which in turn increased corpo-
ratization. The new owners—whether shareholders in a public 
company or private investors—see the enterprise more as a profit-
making endeavor and less as a contribution to society. Profit mar-
gins of four to five percent are not sexy enough for investors.57 This 
has made publishers search more intensively for breakout books, 
“black swans” that will become mega-sellers.58 But as quintessential 
examples—such as Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone, which was re-
jected by twelve publishers before it found a home,59 and Capital in 
54. Id. at 190, 212–19.
55. Editors are reluctant to admit how great the level of uncertainty is. After all, the 
editor’s job is to select potential winners out of a mountain of proffered manuscripts, just as 
the stockbroker’s job is to select potential winners in the stock market. On the condition 
that he would not be identified, someone who spent his career in book publishing conced-
ed: “Why is it that this book we’re really hot on turns out to be an absolute bomb and then 
something we just didn’t expect at all takes off? . . . We don’t know, we just don’t know.” Id. at 
191 (emphasis in original) (quoting the unnamed publishing executive).
56. Id. at 220–22.
57. See SCHIFFRIN, supra note 3, at 107 (quoting a knowledgeable source as stating that 
“mergers have increased the obsession with the bottom line,” and also reporting that the 
“big companies impose sales quotas.”).
58. This discussion of how publishers must rely on big books is drawn from THOMPSON,
supra note 6, at 188–212.
59. Sam Marsden, The Cuckoo’s Calling: publishers’ embarrassment at turning down JK Rowl-
ing detective novel, THE TELEGRAPH (July 14, 2013, 6:59 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
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the Twenty-First Century, a dense book with charts and mathematical 
formulae about income inequality in Western societies that aston-
ished everyone by becoming a runaway, international bestseller60—
demonstrate, no one can confidently predict which books will be 
blockbusters. Nevertheless, corporatization has forced publishers
into relentlessly seeking bestsellers and super-bestsellers. That, in 
turn, has led them to publish and heavily promote books that seem 
comparable to recent bestsellers.61
Consolidation has not only created financial incentives for a 
business model based on a search for bestsellers and blockbusters, 
but it has also made that business model more feasible. Just as an 
investor is more likely to purchase a stock that skyrockets in value if 
she buys positions in, say, two hundred companies rather than 
twenty companies, a book publisher has a better chance of publish-
ing bestsellers if, through its multiple divisions, it publishes two 
hundred titles a year rather than twenty titles. That does not mean 
the model works perfectly—or even very well. No matter how care-
ful the selection process, unprofitable and barely profitable books 
are likely to outnumber very profitable books. And the competition 
for brand-name authors whose works can be reliably expected to 
become bestsellers results in publishers over-guaranteeing their 
royalties with large advances, thereby reducing profit margins even 
on bestsellers.62 All of this explains why book publishing remains 
an industry with relatively small profit margins, even among the 
large, top-tier publishers.
Consolidation has not reduced the number of books being pub-
lished. On the contrary, there has been a general upward trend in 
the number of different titles published annually in the United 
States.63 Nor, by most accounts, has the quality of the work publish-
culture/books/10178960/The-Cuckoos-Calling-publishers-embarrassment-at-turning-down-
JK-Rowling-detective-novel.html.
60. Marc Tracy, Picketty’s ‘Capital’: A Hit That Was, Wasn’t, Then Was Again, NEW 
REPUBLIC (Apr. 24, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/117498/pikettys-capital-sold-
out-harvard-press-scrambling; see also Sam Tanenhaus, Hey, Big Thinker, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/27/fashion/Thomas-Piketty-the-Economist-
Behind-Capital-in-the-Twenty-First-Century-sensation.html?_r=0.
61. THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 202–04.
62. Id. at 216.
63. Before 1980, traditional book publishers published less than 50,000 different book 
titles per year in the United States. Id. at 239. This climbed to 265,000 in 2000, and about 
316,000 in 2010. Id. at 240. Since that time, the number of different titles seems to have 
plateaued or slightly decreased. In 2014, 309,957 different titles were published by tradi-
tional book publishers in the United States, a slight reduction from the prior year. Tradition-
al Print Book Production Dipped Slightly in 2013, BOWKER (Aug. 5, 2014), http://
www.bowker.com/news/2014/Traditional-Print-Book-Production-Dipped-Slightly-in-
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ers do—particularly in editing—declined.64 The question of 
whether consolidation has, on the whole, been good for authors is 
more difficult to answer. Famous writers, from Daniel Silva and 
Nora Roberts to Hillary Clinton and Bill O’Reilly, have surely ben-
efitted from greater capital and fiercer competition for potential 
blockbusters. Meanwhile, less famous authors may be disadvan-
taged because some large publishing groups forbid their constitu-
ent imprints from bidding against each other for new titles.65 An 
author who may have two or three publishers interested in her 
book in an unconsolidated industry may, in the current era, only 
have one interested publisher.
Perhaps the most worrisome result of consolidation is the ho-
mogenization of published content. As previously mentioned, the 
more-intense search for future bestsellers causes publishers to look 
for books similar to past bestsellers. Still, with more than 300,000 
different titles published in the United States each year, there is a 
very rich diversity in books published. But there is less diversity in 
what publishers vigorously market and promote, and thus there is 
less diversity in what comes to readers’ attention. Sociologist John 
B. Thompson, who has studied book publishing, explains:
[T]he key issue in the field of trade publishing today is not 
so much diversity of output, it is diversity in the marketplace.
In other words, the real source of concern is not the diver-
sity or otherwise of the books that are published, but rather 
the diversity or otherwise of the books that are noticed, pur-
chased and read. The field may be characterized by an ex-
2013.html. Not all of these are trade books; a significant share are academic works. Never-
theless, about 50,000 fiction titles are published annually. THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 241.
64. See THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 145 (stating that “it is difficult to see any substance 
in the view that, as a general trend, editors in the large corporations do less editing today 
than editors did in the past”). But see SCHIFFRIN, supra note 3, at 152 (arguing that oligopoly 
and corporatization are turning books into “mere adjuncts to the world of the mass media, 
offering light entertainment and reassurances that all is for the best in this, the best of all 
possible worlds”).
65. See SCHIFFRIN, supra note 3, at 81 (criticizing the practice of allowing constituent 
imprints to bid against each other because it leads to much higher advances for famous au-
thors); THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 139 (stating that in some instances publishing compa-
nies allow their imprints to bid against each other while in other instances there is one 
house bid with the understanding that, if successful, the author and agent may select which 
of the company’s imprints will publish the book); Kachka, supra note 21, at A23 (describing 
a “persistent gripe of writers and agents” that large publishing companies either forbid or 
restrict their constituent imprints from bidding against each other for manuscripts).
Schiffrin also argues that consolidation has resulted in the CEOs of parent corporations per-
sonally directing that their book publishers pay excessive advances for books by powerful 
friends and politicians. SCHIFFRIN, supra note 3, at 80–81.
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tremely diverse output, but if only a very limited number 
and range of titles are picked out and noticed—that is, 
made visible in a crowded marketplace—then we have a 
different kind of problem about diversity.66
This is a very important point—one very much related to the 
problem of treating books like cans of olive oil67—and one dis-
cussed below. For now, it just bears highlighting that there may be 
just as much output in the industry as before, and just as much di-
versity in the total output—that is, just as many different titles pub-
lished and in just as broad a spectrum of genres and topics—but 
far less diversity in which books are brought to readers’ attention 
and, therefore, find an audience.
Perhaps surprisingly, consolidation has not reduced the total 
number of book publishers. In fact, there are more book publish-
ers than ever before.68 In 2004, there were an estimated 62,815 
book publishers in the United States. That is an astounding num-
ber. However, only 6.5 percent of the publishers had annual reve-
nues exceeding $1,000,000, and nearly three-quarters of them had 
annual revenues of no more than $50,000.69 Why are there so many 
small—even tiny—publishers? The principal reason is that the 
costs of entry are quite low in this industry. Moreover, desktop 
publishing replacing physical typography has further lowered entry 
costs.70 Someone who loves books and dreams about being a pub-
lisher can set up shop and try to succeed. Small publishers, howev-
er, are often undercapitalized and under constant financial stress.71
66. THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 397. One is reminded of the words of poet Thomas 
Gray:
Full many a gem of purest ray serene,
The dark unfathom’d caves of ocean bear:
Full many a flow’r is born to blush unseen,
And waste its sweetness on the desert air.
ELEGY WRITTEN IN A COUNTRY CHURCHYARD 8 (5th ed. 1751).
67. Ironically, the corporatization of the industry as a whole, which included previously-
independent publishers being absorbed into conglomerates and the growth of chain 
bookstores, resulted in books being increasingly treated like other commodities by the in-
dustry itself. Thompson observes that “the more books were treated like any other commod-
ity and subjected to the same principles of retailing, the more the chains would be forced to 
focus on fast-selling titles by brand-name authors at the expense of those titles that would 
add depth and range to the store but that would have much slower stock turns.” THOMPSON,
supra note 6, at 35.
68. Id. at 153.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 155.
71. Id. at 162.
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As already noted, success in this industry depends not merely in 
publishing a book but in getting a book noticed. Small publishers 
do not have the same contacts with book review editors at major 
newspapers and magazines or to producers at syndicated radio 
shows, not to mention the resources to pay retailers to feature their 
books at tables in the front of a bookstore or on their website 
homepages.72 It has long been said that “every independent pub-
lisher is just one crisis away from bankruptcy,” and that statement 
appears to be especially true today.73
On the whole, however, until recently book publishing was a rel-
atively stable industry—at least for large and medium-sized firms. It 
may have been an industry with inherently small profit margins 
(despite the demands of new corporate chieftains) and its share of 
challenges, but it was, nevertheless, an industry that produced
something of great value for which there will always be a reliable 
and durable demand. That, at least, was the traditional view. In 
2004, however, dark clouds appeared on the horizon. The National 
Endowment for the Arts (NEA) released a report titled Reading at 
Risk.74 The document began:
Reading at Risk is not a report the National Endowment for 
the Arts is happy to issue. This comprehensive survey of 
American literary reading presents a detailed but bleak as-
sessment of the decline of reading’s role in the nation’s
culture. For the first time in modern history, less than half 
of the adult population now reads literature, and these 
trends reflect a larger decline in other sorts of reading.75
As social trends go, this one was moving quickly.76 Most concern-
ing of all, the rate of decline was greatest among young adults. For 
72. Publishers pay large retailers to display their books. Id. at 35.
73. Id. at 173.
74. NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, READING AT RISK: A SURVEY OF READING IN 
AMERICA (2004), https://www.arts.gov/publications/reading-risk-survey-literary-reading-
america-0.
75. Id. at vii.
76. In just the past twenty years, the portion of adult Americans reading literature had 
dropped 10.2%. Id. at ix. “Literature” was defined as novels, short stories, plays, and poetry. 
Id. at 1. The portion of Americans who said they had read any form of literature for leisure 
over the past twelve months declined from 56.9% in 1982 to 46.7% in 2002. Id. at ix. There
was a parallel drop in reading nonfiction as well. Id. A second NEA study confirmed the 
drop in reading three years later. NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, TO READ OR NOT 
TO READ: A QUESTION OF NATIONAL CONSEQUENCE (2007), https://www.arts.gov/sites/
default/files/ToRead.pdf. Among other things, the second survey found that over a ten-year 
period the average spending on books by American households fell from an already paltry 
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example, the percentage of Americans reading literature in the 
eighteen to twenty-four years of age group dropped seventeen per-
cent in the past two decades, a decline rate of twenty-eight per-
cent.77 While book publishing was not about to suddenly disappear, 
it now looked like an industry with a declining market.78
Meanwhile, something equally disturbing—and far more imme-
diate—was going on.
B. Amazon
In 1994, Jeff Bezos left Manhattan and the hedge fund at which 
he worked, moved to Seattle, and founded Amazon.79 Bezos’ objec-
tive was to create a company that would sell commodities of all 
kinds over the internet. He began with books for three reasons. 
First, books are not fragile and are easy to ship. Second, selling 
books would allow Amazon to gather valuable data about its cus-
tomers which could be used effectively to sell them other goods 
and services later.80 Does a customer order books about financial 
investing, traveling, gourmet cooking, or new cars? That just 
scratches the surface. It is easy to see why librarians safeguard their 
patrons borrowing history.81 Amazon would know if a customer or-
dered The Cancer Fighting Kitchen,82 How To Find a Good Psychothera-
$35.00 to $27.00 per year. Id. at 49. By contrast, on average Americans watch television for 
two hours and twenty-one minutes per day on weekdays and more than three hours per day 
on weekends and holidays. Id. at 39 tbls. 3B & 3C.
77. Id. at xi, 26.
78. Surprisingly, a third NEA report, issued in 2009, showed a possible reversal of the 
trend. NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, READING ON THE RISE: A NEW CHAPTER IN 
AMERICAN LITERACY (2009). According to the third report, the portion of adult Americans 
reading literature bottomed out at 46.7% in 2002 and rose to 50.2% in 2008. Id. at 3–4.
However, that may have been partly due to the researchers expanding the definition of “lit-
erature” to include fiction, poetry, or drama read online. Id. at 8. Most significant for book 
publishers, the report showed that while the number of Americans reading books increased 
due to an increase in population, the percentage of Americans reading books continued to 
decline. Id. at 7.
79. George Packer, Cheap Words: Amazon Is Good for Consumers. But Is It Good for Books?,
NEW YORKER, Feb. 17 & 24, 2004, at 66, 67.
80. Id. at 68.
81. Principle III of the Code of Ethics of the American Library Association states: “We 
protect each library user’s right to privacy and confidentiality with respect to information 
sought or received and resources consulted, borrowed, acquired or transmitted.” Professional 
Ethics, AM. LIBRARY ASS’N, http://www.ala.org/advocacy/proethics/codeofethics/
codeethics.
82. REBECCA KATZ & MAT EDELSON THE CANCER-FIGHTING KITCHEN: NOURISHING, BIG-
FLAVOR RECIPES FOR CANCER TREATMENT AND RECOVERY (2009).
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pist,83 What To Do When You’re Dating a Jew?,84 Parenting a Child with 
Asperger’s Syndrome,85 or In Trump We Trust: E Pluribus Awesome!.86
Amazon would know a great deal indeed about someone after they 
ordered a dozen or more books. Third, customers who order 
books are, as a group, affluent, and information about them is es-
pecially commercially valuable. 
At first, publishers were thrilled with Amazon.87 It was a great 
new way to market and distribute books. Among other things, it 
helped sell books on publishers’ backlists.88 If a reader decided she 
wanted to read a biography of Abraham Lincoln, she could browse 
through the hundreds of available titles on Amazon’s website, se-
lect one, even one published years ago and no longer carried by 
traditional bookstores, order it, and have it within a few days. And 
she could do all of this without leaving her house. 
Amazon attracted customers by creating an appealing, user-
friendly, and very informative website. It included customer ratings 
and comments, as well as editorial blurbs and reviews about books. 
Amazon even hired a staff to supplement what was available by 
writing their own reviews and creating lists of favorite books that 
their reviewers thought had special merit.89 And Amazon came up 
with other useful features. For example, a reader who liked a par-
ticular book could see what other books readers of that book were 
purchasing. Amazon’s website was a fabulous success. It did not
take long before at least thirty million people visited the website 
per day.90 Publishers had every reason to hope that Amazon might 
increase book reading and book sales.
In its early days, Amazon was, from the publishers’ point of view, 
a traditional bookseller, though a national and increasingly suc-
cessful one. Their financial arrangement with Amazon was essen-
tially the same as with physical bookstores. Publishers set suggested 
retail prices for their books and then sold their books to retailers at 
some percentage of that price. For example, a publisher might set 
a suggested retail price for a new book at $24.99 and sell that book 
to retailers at a wholesale price of $14.99, forty percent below the 
83. JUDITH CECERE STRIANO, HOW TO FIND A GOOD PSYCHOTHERAPIST (1988).
84. VIKKI WEIS & JENNIFER A. BLOCK, WHAT TO DO WHEN YOU’RE DATING A JEW:
EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW FROM MAZOH BALLS TO MARRIAGE (2000).
85. BRENDA BOYD, PARENTING A CHILD WITH ASPERGER SYNDROME (2003).
86. ANN COULTER, IN TRUMP WE TRUST: E PLURIBUS AWESOME! (2016).
87. Packer, supra note 79, at 69.
88. Id. at 68–69.
89. Id. at 69.
90. Id.
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suggested retail price.91 The retailer was free to sell the book at any 
price it chose. If it wanted to stick to the suggested retail price, that 
was fine. If it wanted to discount New York Times bestsellers by sell-
ing them ten or twenty percent below suggested retail prices, that 
was fine, as well. Publishers received their wholesale price regard-
less. In theory, a retailer was free to sell books below their whole-
sale price. In practice, however, this seldom happened because, in-
stead of taking a loss on a book that was not moving off its shelf, a 
retailer could simply return that book for a credit.92 From its incep-
tion, Amazon more deeply discounted books than other retailers,
but so what?93 Publishers made the same amount. Besides, lower 
prices might mean more books sold. Publishers also liked Amazon 
because it paid faster and returned fewer books than most brick-
and-mortar booksellers.94
However, as Amazon’s market share grew, so did its leverage to 
extract better terms from publishers. In this regard, Amazon was 
like other companies that achieved a dominant position over the 
distribution of products in a particular field. Often, those who cre-
ate products—physical or intellectual—are taken hostage by those 
who distribute their products. When Comcast, for example, be-
came the dominant cable provider, it demanded increasingly rich 
tributes from the networks and cable channels that produced the 
shows that Comcast’s customers wanted to watch. Walmart has sim-
ilarly been able to hold hostage manufacturers who sell large 
shares of their total output through Walmart stores. In theory, the 
Robinson-Patman Act prohibits Amazon, Comcast, or Walmart 
from extracting better terms from suppliers than are available to 
their smaller rivals, but Robinson-Patman is notoriously weak legis-
lation and there are many ways around it.95
91. See THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 368–69 (describing the traditional model).
92. Id. at 285–91.
93. Amazon offered a thirty-five percent discount of both hardback and paperback 
bestsellers, and ten percent on hundreds of thousands of other titles. See id. at 42–43.
94. See Packer, supra note 79, at 68–69.
95. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 779 (5th ed. 2016) (stating “[t]he Robinson-Patman Act is a 
morass of technical requirements that often hide or subvert its basic purpose.”); THOMPSON,
supra note 6, at 301 (“[W]hile in principle the Robinson-Patman Act creates a level playing 
field among retailers in the US, in practice there are many ways in which this playing field 
can be turned into rough and uneven ground that gives large retailers certain advantages 
either because they are able to leverage their size and strategic importance to exact better 
terms and conditions or because the small independent booksellers are less efficient, less 
well-equipped in terms of their IT infrastructure or simply less well organized.”).
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One way Amazon extracted better terms was through coopera-
tive advertising, or “co-op” programs.96 These programs existed in 
the book industry long before Amazon came along. Co-op policies 
are designed, in theory, as a means by which publishers pay a share 
of a retailer’s costs of marketing and promoting that publisher’s
books. The amount that a publisher provides to the retailer for 
these purposes, and the methods under which the money is pro-
vided, depends upon each individual publisher’s co-op policy.
Most typically, a publisher makes available a particular sum based 
on the amount of a retailer’s net sales of the publisher’s books in
the prior year. Thus, if a publisher’s co-op policy was three per-
cent, and the retailer’s net sales of that publisher’s books in the 
previous year were $100,000, then the publisher would make avail-
able to that retailer $3,000 to spend promoting its books in the 
current year.97 Co-op programs were traditionally a way to evade 
requirements of the Robinson-Patman Act, but following litigation 
between small, independent booksellers and the large chain stores 
in 1982, 1994, and 1998, publishers agreed to make their co-op 
programs more clear and transparent.98
Nevertheless, Amazon used its power to demand increasingly fa-
vorable terms, and its unique status as an internet seller gave it an 
argument that special treatment did not violate the Robinson-
Patman Act. For example, publishers were used to paying retailers 
to display their books on tables in the front of their stores and on 
end caps with book covers rather than book spines facing out. Am-
azon took this to a new level. It demanded that publishers pay it 
$10,000 to feature a book on its homepage.99 Amazon demanded 
larger co-op fees and adjusted its recommendation algorithms to 
disfavor books by recalcitrant publishers.100 The customer search-
ing for the best biography of Lincoln may not realize it, but when 
she types “Abraham Lincoln” or “Lincoln biographies” into Ama-
zon’s search engine, the books she sees, and the order in which 
96. See generally THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 261 (describing how cooperative advertis-
ing works in the book industry generally).
97. Id.
98. The American Booksellers Association, which is composed of small, independent 
booksellers, has twice filed lawsuits complaining that publishers give large retail chains bet-
ter terms in price, credit, and return policies. Id. at 33–34, 299–302.
99. See Packer, supra note 79, at 70.
100. Id. at 71.
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they are displayed, are in part determined by the promotional fees 
paid by the publishers.101
Moreover, Amazon played the hardest of hardball. Starting with 
the smallest and weakest publishers, Amazon demanded increas-
ingly favorable terms, especially on promotional fees. Amazon 
CEO Jeff Bezos told his staff to approach “small publishers the way 
a cheetah would pursue a sickly gazelle.”102 In negotiations with a 
new publisher named Melville House in 2004, Amazon made de-
mands that Dennis Johnson, Melville House’s co-owner, consid-
ered extortionate.103 He refused and reported the shakedown to 
Publisher’s Weekly, which ran a story. The next day, Amazon re-
moved the “buy” button from all Melville House books on its web-
site. Eight percent of Melville House’s total sales were through 
Amazon, and it could not afford to lose that much of its business. 
Melville House had no choice but to capitulate. That was well over 
a decade ago, and today, Amazon is far more powerful. It sells 
more than forty percent of all books in the United States, includ-
ing hardback, paperback, and electronic.104
Amazon has, in large part, replaced “co-op fees” with “marketing 
development funds,” but the essential features are the same: Pub-
lishers pay Amazon a percentage of their gross sales on its website 
from the previous year.105 The percentage is renegotiated annually, 
and it has steadily increased. The fees used to be in the range of 
two to three percent of gross sales; they are now typically five to 
seven percent for large retailers and even higher for sickly ga-
zelles.106 This has pushed these fees to the point where, when a cus-
tomer buys a book on its website, Amazon keeps more than half 
the sale price.107 This, of course, in no way reflects the relative val-
ues added by the author, publisher, or Amazon. It simply reflects 
the relative market power of the parties.
From the publishers’ standpoint, all of that was bad enough. But 
things became dramatically more threatening after Amazon 
101. Id. Following a lengthy investigation, the FTC decided that similar practices by 
Google did not violate antitrust laws. Marina Lao, Search, Essential Facilities, and the Antitrust 
Duty to Deal, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 275, 276 (2013).
102. Packer, supra note 79, at 71.
103. See id.
104. Foer, supra note 10, at 20. The author does not have information about Amazon’s
market share of audio books.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Packer reports that, as of 2014, Random House, the largest publishing company in 
the United States, paid Amazon an effective discount of fifty-three percent and small pub-
lishers paid up to sixty percent. See Packer, supra note 79, at 71–72.
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launched its Kindle ebook reader in November 2007.108 There was 
nothing inherently worrisome about electronic books per se; quite 
the contrary, electronic books do not have to be printed, bound, 
or shipped. Best of all, unsold copies are not returned. The prob-
lem was that Amazon announced that it was going to sell the ebook 
versions of new releases109 and New York Times bestsellers for $9.99. 
That made publishers terribly unhappy.
Why should publishers care about Amazon’s retail prices even 
though they did not affect how much Amazon paid publishers? 
The reason was simple: Selling books at $9.99 devalued them.110 It 
created the impression in the public’s mind that was what books 
were worth, even though publishers (not to mention authors) be-
lieved they were worth considerably more. Publishers feared that, if
this went on long enough, consumers would not be willing to pay 
more than $9.99 for a book. The publishers were, in fact, aware of 
a precedent that frightened them: music. When Apple opened its 
iTunes store in April 2003, it made 200,000 individual songs avail-
able for ninety-nine cents each.111 Within a very short time, the 
price established the value of a song in the public’s mind. The mu-
sic industry was generally pleased and cooperated with Apple on its 
iTunes store because songs were promiscuously pirated through 
Napster and similar websites. One of the principal benefits of 
iTunes was that it reversed the conventional wisdom, in the minds 
of teenagers especially, that songs were free. Nevertheless, the 
point remains: Ninety-nine cents became the accepted value of a 
song. Book publishers were worried that, in much the same way, 
Amazon was establishing $9.99 as the value of a book.
Publishers conceded that ebooks should be less expensive than 
physical books, and they priced their ebooks accordingly. The costs 
of printing, binding, warehousing, and shipping books represented 
about twenty percent of the total costs of producing a book. Eighty
108. See THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 368–69.
109. New releases are books that have been released within the current month. See Trial 
Transcript at 331, United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2013) 
(No. 12 CV 2826) [hereinafter Trial Transcript, United States v. Apple Inc.]. The trial tran-
script is consecutively paginated and is scattered across ECF Nos. 388, 390, 392, 394, 396, 
398, 400, 402, 404, 406, and 408.
110. See generally THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 369–70
111. Cf. WALTER ISAACSON, STEVE JOBS 394–402 (2013 ed.). Record companies received 
seventy percent of the sale price of their songs on iTunes. Id. at 396. When, six years later, 
record companies and artists prevailed upon Apple to raise the price of many songs to 
$1.29, there was concern that customers would revolt. Dawn C. Chmielewski, Hottest tracks to 
cost $1.29 at ITunes starting April 7, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/
2009/mar/26/business/fi-cotown-itunes26; see also THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 371.
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percent of publishing costs go to author royalties, editor salaries, 
and marketing. As a general rule, therefore, some publishers 
thought ebooks should sell for about eighty percent of the hard-
back price.112 Their goal was to make roughly the same net profit
on physical books and ebooks so that they could be indifferent as 
to which version readers preferred.113 Some publishers set suggest-
ed retail prices for ebooks at eighty percent of the list price for the 
hardback version and sold their ebooks to Amazon at a forty-eight 
percent discount from that price.114 Thus, if the list price of the 
hardback version of a new release was $24.99, the wholesale ebook 
price was $10.40.115 Amazon sold that ebook to its customers for 
$9.99, and lost forty-one cents on each sale. Some new releases had 
hardback list prices of $27.99 or $29.99; Amazon’s losses on the 
ebook version of those titles were $1.65 and $2.48 respectively. 
Whether these losses were reduced to some extent by marketing 
development fees is not entirely clear. The trial court did not con-
sider this of great importance in the Apple case and gave it little 
attention. It found that “Amazon’s $9.99 price point roughly 
matched the wholesale price of many of its ebooks,” and did not 
elaborate.116 Even if Amazon broke even in terms of its gross mar-
gin, that fails to take into account Amazon’s overhead costs. More-
over, Amazon’s ebook prices were below its wholesale prices for 
eighty percent of all new releases.117 Its losses on ebooks were, 
therefore, considerable. 
Amazon claimed it was willing to sustain such losses because it 
was following a loss-leader strategy. That is, it was willing to sustain 
losses on the sales of ebooks in order to stimulate sales for its Kin-
dle, which was selling for $399.00 when first introduced.118 Wheth-
er Amazon was following a legitimate loss-leader strategy—as op-
112. This appears to have been a popular practice, though some publishers set one price 
for all of its ebooks, such as $16.99. See THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 337, 368.
113. Id. at 373; see also Trial Transcript, United States v. Apple Inc., supra note 109, at
498–99, 515, 558, 600 (testimony of Carolyn Kroll Reidy, President and CEO of Simon & 
Shuster, explaining repeatedly that she considered the crucial question in ebook pricing to 
be the relationship between the ebook price and the price of the physical book).
114. See THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 369. See generally Trial Transcript, United States v. 
Apple Inc., supra note 109, at 573 (testimony of Carolyn Kroll Reidy).
115. For a hardback with a list price of $24.99, the suggested ebook retail price was 
$19.99 (twenty percent off the hardback list price), and the wholesale ebook price was forty-
eight percent off from that price. See THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 369.
116. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 649; see also United States v. Apple Inc., 791 F.3d 290,
299 (2nd Cir. 2015) (accepting the district court’s finding).
117. Brief of Amici Curiae The Authors Guild, Inc. et al. at 12 n.8, Apple Inc. v. United 
States, No. 15-565 (U.S. Dec. 2, 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1376 (2016).
118. THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 369–70.
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posed to an illegal predatory pricing strategy, designed to deter ri-
vals from entering the market119—would depend, in part, on 
whether it was making a profit on its Kindle and ebook business 
taken as a whole. That is, Amazon might take losses on ebooks in 
order to make profits on the Kindle if it thought that was the best 
way to maximize net profits. Notwithstanding Amazon’s claims, 
however, it was possible that Amazon was willing to sustain losses in 
its entire ereader/ebook business until its dominant position was 
irreversible.120 Once enough readers had Kindles, it would be diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for rivals to successfully enter the market.121
This was, moreover, consistent with Jeff Bezos’s philosophy of fa-
voring growing market share over short-term profitability.122
It was a successful strategy. Barnes & Noble introduced its 
ereader in November 2009, almost exactly two years after Amazon 
introduced its Kindle. Critics rated the Nook as better than the 
Kindle,123 and the Nook turned out to be more successful than 
119. Predatory pricing is below-cost pricing designed either to drive rivals out of a mar-
ket or deter rivals from entering a market. See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 95, at 455–93; 
STEPHEN F. ROSS, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST 55–72 (1993). A great deal of attention has been 
given to how cost should be defined, and specifically whether marginal cost, average variable 
cost, or average total cost should be used for this purpose. That question has little relevance 
when evaluating pricing by a retailer, such as Amazon, who is selling below the wholesale 
prices it paid. It is selling below cost under any definition.
120. This is a classic, real-world example of predatory pricing, which is most effective as a 
means of deterring potential rivals from entering the market. As Herbert Hovenkamp ob-
serves, “Predatory pricing and other pricing strategies are generally plausible only for firms 
that are already dominant in their markets.” HOVENKAMP, supra note 95, at 469. Moreover, 
predatory pricing is commonly directed against prospective rivals who are contemplating 
entering the market. Id. at 461, 463.
121. John B. Thompson suggests that that was Amazon’s objective. He writes that Ama-
zon hoped to sell enough Kindles “to establish a dominant position in the market.”
THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 369–70. While it may be possible to read Nook books on a Kin-
dle, it is difficult to do so. See Marziah Karch, How to Read Nook and Kobo Apps on Your Kindle 
Fire, Lifewire, http://google.about.com/od/kindlefire/ss/How-To-Install-Nook-And-Kobo-
Apps-On-Your-Kindle-Fire.htm (last updated Oct. 22, 2018) (advising Kindle Fire users that 
they “may run into difficulty if [they] want to read Nook, Kobo, or Google eBooks”); Lina 
M. Khan, Comment, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 760 (2017) (stating that 
Amazon and other ebook sellers “used a scheme known as ‘digital rights management’ [to 
limit] the types of devices that can read certain e-book formats.”).
122. Bezos announced this philosophy in his first public letter to investors. BRAD STONE,
THE EVERYTHING STORE: JEFF BEZOS AND THE AGE OF AMAZON 69 (2013). Amazon did not 
make a profit in its first nine years of operation. Saul Hansell, Technology; Amazon Reports First 
Full-Year Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2004, at C00003, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/
28/business/technology-amazon-reports-first-full-year-profit.html; see also FRANKLIN FOER,
WORLD WITHOUT MIND: THE EXISTENTIAL THREAT OF BIG TECH 224–25 (2017) (noting that 
Bezos convinced investors of the benefits of Amazon’s growth-instead-of-profits strategy).
123. See, e.g., CONSUMER REPORTS BUYING GUIDE 2014, at 61 (2014) (rating the two ver-
sions of the Nook ahead of four versions of the Kindle in the six- to seven-inch category of 
ebook readers, the only category in which Barnes & Noble competed). A third competitor, 
Kobo, has captured a very small market share, and Sony competed in the market for a time 
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even Barnes & Noble had anticipated.124 Nevertheless, the Kindle 
enjoyed a significant advantage over the Nook: a two-year lead. 
Many customers who were interested in ereaders already owned 
Kindles. They were likely to buy ebooks exclusively from Amazon, 
and unlikely to buy a second ereader for a considerable period of 
time. Moreover, as the first popular ereader, the Kindle brand 
name had become nearly synonymous with the product category. 
People did not call ereaders “ereaders”; they called them “Kin-
dles,” just as people used to call refrigerators “Frigidaires,” tissues 
“Kleenex,” and cola drinks “Cokes,” or today call a browser search 
“Googling.”125 Even with a superior product, Barnes & Noble would 
ultimately capture no more than twenty-five percent of the mar-
ket.126 Amazon’s two-year lead gave it brand recognition and ac-
ceptance that were hard to challenge.
There may have been another reason why Amazon successfully 
maintained dominance. Amazon’s strategy of selling bestselling 
ebooks at a loss put Barnes & Noble in something of a pickle. 
Barnes & Noble had entered the ebook business reluctantly. Un-
like Amazon, its principal business was physical bookstores; it op-
erated about seven hundred self-standing superstores and nearly 
one hundred smaller stores in malls.127 It did not to want to en-
courage the growth of ebooks.
Nevertheless, Barnes & Noble really had no choice but to enter 
the ereader/ebook market; it could not afford to stay out of that 
market only to discover too late that ebooks had largely replaced 
physical books. So, it invested in developing its own ereader. In or-
der to compete with Amazon, however, it was forced to sell the 
most popular ebooks at $9.99. That led Barnes & Noble to sustain 
losses, and the more books it sold, the more money it lost.128 Barnes 
& Noble, therefore, faced a dilemma: It needed to promote its 
ebook business, yet at the same time it could not afford to be too 
successful. Nor could Barnes & Noble hope to beat Amazon at its 
but closed its ebook store in March 2014. See Welcome Reader Store Customers, KOBO, https://
www.kobo.com/sony (last visited Nov. 30, 2018).
124. Trial Transcript, United States v. Apple Inc., supra note 109, at 2174–75.
125. See Herbert B. Dixon Jr., The Courtroom of the Present: The Bare Essentials for a Techno-
logically Competent Courtroom, 48 JUDGES’ J. 37, 37 (2009) (regarding brand names that be-
came synonymous with product categories); see also, e.g., Brian Heater, E-Reader Innovation 
Has Stalled, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 12, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/10/12/e-reader-
innovation-has-stalled/ (“Kindle has become synonymous with e-reader for most mainstream 
users.”).
126. THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 339.
127. Id. at 29.
128. Trial Transcript, United States v. Apple Inc., supra note 109, at 2173–76, 2179, 2441.
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own game of winning and maintaining market share through loss-
leader pricing. As a much larger and better-positioned company, 
Amazon could absorb greater losses, and do so over a longer peri-
od of time.129 Indeed, Barnes & Noble represented to the court that 
it could not have continued to promote the Nook and its ebook 
business under the existing system.130 Thus, while Amazon’s strate-
gy of below-cost pricing in ebooks did not succeed in keeping 
Barnes & Noble out of the ebook market entirely, it may have 
caused Barnes & Noble to pull its punches when deciding how ag-
gressively to promote its Nook and ebook business. Moreover, if 
Amazon was able to continue its loss-leader pricing strategy, it may 
well have succeeded in driving Barnes & Noble out of the ebook 
business.
Amazon may have driven publishers out of the business as well. 
At the time of the dispute, physical books still accounted for nine-
ty-five percent of publishers’ sales, and publishers could still sell 
physical books at whatever prices the market would bear.131 But this 
was cold comfort. For one thing, the public would come to believe 
that the contents of books were worth $9.99, and the rest of the 
price for hardbacks and paperbacks were related to the physical 
package. That is, in fact, not the case. Paper, printing, and distri-
bution together constitute only a small fraction of the cost of a 
physical book.132 The lion’s share of the costs are in author royal-
ties, editorial work, and marketing and promotion. If the price of a 
new hardback were $29.99 and the price of the Kindle versions 
were $9.99, how long would people be willing to purchase hard-
backs? And, indeed, at the time of the dispute it was unclear 
whether physical books would survive. In 2006, the large trade pub-
lishers received, on average, about 0.1% of their revenue from 
ebook sales.133 By 2010, that had risen to eight percent—and indus-
try analysts were projecting that percentage could skyrocket to as 
129. In 2010, Amazon ranked forty-seventh in the Fortune 500 and had revenues of 
more than $61.1 billion while Barnes & Noble ranked number 360 and had revenues of $7.1 
billion. Largest U.S. Corporations, FORTUNE, May 20, 2013, at F-3 and F-19. Both companies 
recorded losses in 2010, but Amazon’s business strategy—well-understood and supported by 
its shareholders and investors—included a willingness to operate at a loss and build to 
shareholder value.
130. See Brief of Amici Curiae The Authors Guild, Inc. et al., supra note 117, at 20.
131. See United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d. 638, 652–53, aff’d, 791 F.3d 290 (2d 
Cir. 2015) (citing Mokoto Rich, Publishers Delay E-Book Releases, N.Y. TIMES: ARTSBEAT (Dec. 
9, 2009, 4:12 PM), https://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/publishers-delay-e-
book-releases/).
132. THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 337–38.
133. Id. at 321.
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much as twenty-two percent in the very next year.134 No one knew 
whether ebooks would largely supplant physical books.135 In fact, 
one prominent analyst predicted that paper would be obsolete by 
2015.136 Publishers simply could not survive if they could only sell 
books at $9.99.
If that became the norm, would no one publish books? That 
probably would not come to pass. Publishers would disappear, but 
many authors would self-publish. Authors would either design their 
own covers or hire professional designers, forego professional edit-
ing or hire their own editors, promote their own books or hire 
specialists to assist them with that too. Some talented writers who 
did not want to be entrepreneurs might give up writing books en-
tirely. Would more or less books ultimately be published? No one 
knows. But with the gatekeepers—as in the agents and publish-
ers—gone, people who always wanted to write books but previously 
could not find agents or publishers interested in their work might 
suddenly feel empowered to write and publish books. It is entirely 
possible that more books might be written than is presently the 
case.
But regardless of whether more or less books were written, it is 
unlikely that this brave new world of book publishing would be 
good for readers. Presently, most terrible manuscripts simply are 
not published. And when traditional publishers believe they have 
an extraordinarily good book by a new author, they give that book 
special attention, promoting it with book review editors and 
bookstore buyers, advertising it, sending the author on a book 
tour, or nominating it for a literary prize. It may not be a perfect 
system, but at least someone other than the authors themselves are 
134. Id.
135. See id. at 324 (regarding industry uncertainty about whether printed books would 
survive); see also Daniel Victor, The Internet Hasn’t Won: Printed Books Still Prevail, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 5, 2006, at B5 (quoting Lee Rainie, the director of internet, science, and technology 
research for the Pew Foundation, who said that five to ten years ago “there were folks who 
thought the days of the printed book numbered.”). In fact, the opposite has come to pass: 
the sales of physical books have increased while sales of ebooks have declined. See Alexandra 
Alter, The Plot Twist: E-Book Sales Slip, and Print is Far From Dead (Sept. 22, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/09/23/business/media/the-plot-twist-e-book-sales-slip-and-print-is-
far-from-dead.html?_r=0; Jim Milliot, As E-book Sales Decline, Digital Fatigue Grows (Jun. 17, 
2016), http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/digital/retailing/article/70696-as-
e-book-sales-decline-digital-fatigue-grows.html; Sian Cain, Ebook Sales Continue to Fall as 
Younger Generations Drive Appetite for Print (Mar. 14, 2017 7:10 AM), https://
www.theguardian.com/books/2017/mar/14/ebook-sales-continue-to-fall-nielsen-survey-uk-
book-sales.
136. FOER, supra note 122, at 224–25.
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vouching for the quality of books in the first instance.137 In a world 
without gatekeepers, James Patterson fans would still find his next 
book but finding good books by unknown authors would be ex-
tremely difficult. It is no accident that self-published books are not 
eligible for nomination for major awards because, if they were, 
finding great books would be like looking for the proverbial nee-
dle in haystack.138
Amazon might welcome a brave new world without traditional 
publishers. It has become a leader in self-published books, selling 
services to authors who wish to publish in print, Kindle, or audio 
formats.139 While Amazon has competition in that market, it enjoys 
the enormous advantage in being the world’s largest book retailer. 
Authors want their books well-promoted on Amazon’s website, and 
they may reasonably believe that their chances of that increases by 
self-publishing through Amazon itself.
Publishers understood that if they were going to successfully 
take on Amazon, they had to do so collectively.140 Beginning in De-
cember of 2008, the Big Six publishing houses began to talk 
among themselves about finding a way “to create an alternative 
platform to Amazon for e-books.”141 The CEOs of the Big Six met 
approximately every three months to discuss Amazon and other 
137. Four trade magazines specialize in prepublication book reviews: Publishers Weekly,
Library Journal, Kirkus, and Booklist. Bookstore buyers rely heavily on Publishers Weekly,
library selectors rely heavily on Library Journal, and book review editors look at all four. 
Publishers Weekly reviews about 10,000 books per year, which is no more than seventeen 
percent of all books published annually in the United States. See Adelle Waldman, Book Re-
port: How Four Magazines You’ve Probably Never Read Help Determine What Books You Buy, SLATE
(Sept. 12, 2003, 3:28 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/culturebox/2003/09/
book_report.htm; Nick Morgan, Thinking of Self-Publishing Your Book in 2013? Here’s What You 
Need to Know, FORBES (Jan. 8, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nickmorgan/2013/01/
08/thinking-of-self-publishing-your-book-in-2013-heres-what-you-need-to-know/ (stating that 
somewhere between 600,000 and 1,000,000 books are published annually in the United 
States). If publishers disappeared, how would these magazines decide which books to re-
view? Kirkus will currently review a self-published author’s book for a price ($425 to review a 
book within seven to nine weeks). Kirkus Indie, KIRKUS, https://www.kirkusreviews.com/
indie-reviews/how-it-works (last visited Sept. 9, 2018).
138. See, e.g., How the National Book Awards Work, NATIONAL BOOK FOUNDATION (last visit-
ed Oct. 26, 2018), http://www.nationalbook.org/national-book-awards/how-works/ (stating 
that self-published books are not eligible for the National Book Award); Approved Publisher
List, MYSTERY WRITERS OF AMERICA, http://mysterywriters.org/how-to-become-a-member-of-
mwa/approved-publisher-list (last updated Oct. 4, 2018) (stating that only approved pub-
lishers may nominate books for the Edgar Awards).
139. Take Control with Self-Publishing, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/seller-
account/mm-summary-page.html?topic=200260520 (last visited Oct. 26, 2018).
140. See United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 791 
F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Trial Transcript, United States v. Apple Inc., supra note 109, 
at 468.
141. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 651.
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challenges facing their industry. Meetings among competitors have 
always been highly suspect. In 1776, Adam Smith famously wrote: 
“People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merri-
ment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy 
against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.”142 The 
standard advice that lawyers give to their clients is to have antitrust 
counsel present at all meetings with competitors, including trade 
association meetings, to ensure that no prohibited discussions take 
place.143 However, the Big Six CEOs met alone in private dining 
rooms of New York City restaurants,144 without lawyers or other as-
sistants.145 Perhaps, the executives did not know how ominous their 
private dinners would later look. In fact, if there is a term that 
rings alarms in the minds of lawyers and judges, it is “private din-
ner” for the simple reason that some of the most infamous agree-
ments in antitrust history happened to occur at just such a venue.146
Among the topics discussed at these dinners was what to do 
about Amazon. “I hate [Amazon’s] bullying behavior and will be 
happy to support a strategy that restricts their plans for world dom-
ination,” Hachette’s CEO wrote in an email to the CEO of 
Hachette’s parent corporation before one of the dinners.147 Some 
of the publishers had already tried eliminating the wholesale dis-
count for ebooks; rather than setting the wholesale price of an 
ebook at eighty percent of the price of the physical book of the 
same title, they raised the wholesale price to match the price of the 
physical book.148 Their objective was to make Amazon take a larger 
loss on ebooks, thereby pressuring Amazon to raise its prices. But 
that did not work. Amazon was willing to absorb larger losses.
The publishers also discussed among themselves “windowing”
ebook versions of new releases, that is, delaying an ebook edition 
142. ERNEST GELLHORN ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 284
(Thomson West, 5th ed. 2004) (citing ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 128 (Canaan 
ed. 1937)).
143. See, e.g., PRACTICAL LAW ANTITRUST, INVITATIONS TO COLLUDE, PRACTICE NOTE 8-
543-2405 (Thomson Reuters Practical Law 2018) (“Counsel should be notified before any 
meeting between competitors . . . . If the client permits, antitrust counsel should attend the 
meeting.”).
144. See Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 651.
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., William H. Page, The Gary Dinners and the Meaning of Concerted Action, 62 
SMU L. REV. 597 (2009).
147. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 651.
148. Id. at 650; see also Trial Transcript, United States v. Apple Inc., supra note 109, at 
465.
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for a period of time after publication of the hardback edition.149
Four of the Big Six announced that they would window some of 
their ebooks, though their individual policies differed. HarperCol-
lins said it would window five to ten titles per month while Macmil-
lan announced it would window most of its ebooks for a period of 
ninety days following publication in hardback.150 But windowing 
ebooks was problematic. The publishers feared that it would alien-
ate readers and encourage piracy. Penguin conducted a study that 
found that delaying the release of ebooks resulted in a loss of sales 
that was never recovered, and both Penguin and Random House 
decided against windowing ebooks. Even the four publishers who 
decided to window ebooks considered this only a short-term tactic, 
and one of them, Macmillan, wound up never implementing its 
announced policy.151
Here, then, are how things stood at the end of 2009: Amazon 
had the market power to extract discounts from book publishers, 
whether in the form of co-op fees, market development fees, or 
otherwise. Amazon already had an effective monopoly in ebooks, 
and by pricing ebooks below costs Amazon was working toward 
making its monopoly position so entrenched as to be irreversible. 
Amazon was also training the public to believe that ebooks were 
worth $9.99. In the short run, Amazon’s price was an almost in-
surmountable barrier to entry to potential rivals. Beyond Barnes & 
Noble, which was exclusively in the book business and therefore 
had no choice, who would enter the ebook market only to lose 
money? If Amazon succeeded in making its monopoly unassailable 
and irreversible, and if ebooks supplanted print books, Amazon 
would effectively have a monopoly in retailing all books. It would 
be positioned to continue selling ebooks at $9.99 and demand 
price concessions from publishers that would make its ebook busi-
ness profitable.152 In this scenario, publishers might not be able to 
149. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 651–54. The term “windowing” originally referred to 
delaying release of the paperback edition for a period of time, often one year, after publica-
tion of the hardback edition. See id. at 651 n.10; Edward Wyatt, Rethinking the Paperback Time-
line, N.Y. TIMES: ARTSBEAT (June 2, 2008, 10:18 AM), https://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/
2008/06/02/rethinking-the-paperback-timeline/ (“[I]t is still common for publishers to 
wait nine months to a year after a book is released in hardcover to produce a less expensive 
paperback version.”).
150. See Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 653.
151. Id. at 653 n.1; see also United States v. Apple Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 301 (2d Cir. 2015)
(“[T]he publishers viewed even this strategy to save their business model as self-
destructive.”).
152. The antitrust traditionalist will ask, “If Amazon were to have an unassailable mo-
nopoly, would it not raise prices?” I believe that while Amazon would like to capture mo-
nopolist profits, it is more likely—given Amazon’s history and image, and its customers’ ex-
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stay in business by selling books to Amazon at the prices that Ama-
zon would demand—which would suit Amazon just fine. It was al-
ready the leader in selling services to authors who wanted to self-
publish their books, and it was uniquely positioned to become the 
dominant firm in that industry.
Publishers complained bitterly to Amazon about its $9.99 price 
point.153 But if anything, their gnashing of teeth was music to Ama-
zon’s ears. Amazon appeared to be looking forward to the day 
when publishers would go belly up. They had tried acting collec-
tively by eliminating the wholesale discount for ebooks and by win-
dowing ebooks, but those efforts had proved ineffective. Amazon 
was simply too strong. What publishers—and the public—needed 
was a savior to demolish Amazon’s dominant position. That proba-
bly seemed too much to hope for. Yet, at the end of 2009, a savior 
materialized.
C. Apple
That savior was Apple. Only a company as large and powerful as 
Apple could hope to successfully challenge Amazon’s monopoly 
position. Apple was, at the time, number fifty-six on the Fortune 
500 (Amazon was 100).154 Apple was still led by its brilliant founder, 
Steve Jobs, but Jobs was ill. He had been diagnosed with pancreatic 
cancer six years earlier and was living on borrowed time.155 Jobs 
had been the creative force behind iconic products such as the 
Macintosh, iPhone, and iPod. The iPad, Apple’s computer tablet, 
was destined to be his last creation. The iPad was an intimate de-
vice on which one could access email, watch movies, listen to mu-
sic, look at photos, and read newspapers and magazines.156 The 
project had been under development for at least three years.157 At 
nearly the last minute, Apple decided to try to add books. The pub-
lic launch of the iPad was already scheduled for January 27, 2010, 
but, in November of 2009, Steve Jobs gave Eddy Cue the go-ahead 
pectation of $9.99 books—to achieve its objective by keeping the retail price stable and us-
ing its monopsony power to drive down the wholesale price it pays to publishers.
153. See Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 650.
154. Fortune 500 2010, FORTUNE, http://fortune.com/fortune500/2010 (last visited Oct. 
26, 2018).
155. See ISAACSON, supra note 111, at 456, 484, 489.
156. To demonstrate the iPad, Jobs did all of those things at the iPad launch on January
27, 2010. Id. at 493–94.
157. See id. at 491 (reporting that in 2007 Jobs decided to vigorously pursue developing 
an Apple tablet).
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to develop an Apple ebookstore.158 Cue, one of Jobs’s closest asso-
ciates, was in charge of internet content for Apple and had helped 
build the spectacularly successful iTunes Store six years earlier.159
Cue had a personal as well as a professional reason to want to suc-
ceed: He wanted to make his friend’s last new product as successful 
as possible.160
Cue and his team had already done their research on the book 
industry. They knew that the major publishers desperately wanted 
to break Amazon’s stranglehold and end the practice of selling 
bestsellers and new releases for $9.99.161 Cue and his team knew 
that the $9.99 price point meant operating at a loss, and Apple had 
decided that it would enter the ebook business only if it could turn 
a profit.162 They had analyst reports that suggested that a price 
point of $12.99 could offer a reasonable profit margin.163
Beginning on December 8, 2009, Cue’s team began calling each 
of the Big Six to ask them to meet to discuss an “extremely confi-
dential” subject.164 The publishers had little trouble guessing what 
Cue wanted to discuss. The press was reporting that Apple was on 
the verge of announcing a revolutionary new device, and what 
would the leading firm in personal electronic devices want to dis-
cuss with book publishers other than ebooks? The district court 
thought it highly significant that the Big Six CEOs immediately tel-
ephoned each other. There were twenty-one calls between those 
CEOs from Tuesday, December 8, through the end of that work 
week, compared to just one such call in the last four days of the 
previous work week.165 We will discuss the possible significance of 
those calls in more detail later. For now, suffice it to say that the 
antitrust laws do not prohibit rivals from talking to each other or 
158. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 654–55.
159. See ISAACSON, supra note 111, at 574 (regarding Cue’s close relationship with Jobs);
id. at 531 (regarding Cue supervising internet content for Apple); id. at 403 (regarding Cue 
building the iTunes Store).
160. See Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 655.
161. As Cue himself bluntly put it, “all the content owners hate Amazon.” Id. at 654.
162. Id. at 656.
163. The court wrote that the reports “indicated that a price of $12.00 could be a more
profitable price point for e-books than Amazon’s $9.99.” Id. at 654 (emphasis added). This 
erroneously suggests—or, at a minimum, leaves open the possibility—that there was profit at 
selling ebooks at $9.99. The court seemed determined to avoid recognizing that Amazon 
was deliberately losing money on ebooks.
164. Id. at 655.
165. Id. at 709 app. A; cf. id. at 655 n.14, 674.
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exchanging information as long as they do not do so as part of 
some agreement.166
Eddy Cue and two other Apple executives—Keith Moerer, a di-
rector of Apple’s iTunes Store, and Kevin Saul, an Apple in-house 
attorney—traveled from Apple’s headquarters in Cupertino, Cali-
fornia, to New York City, where they had a series of individual 
meetings with each of the Big Six publishers on December 15 and 
16, 2009.167 The district court described the meetings as follows:
Following a script, Apple conveyed in each of these 
meetings that it hoped to be able to begin selling e-books 
through an e-bookstore within the next 90 days as a feature 
on a new web-enabled machine. Apple expected that its en-
try into the market with an iBookstore on this device would 
help make books “cool” for the iTunes generation and 
quickly make Apple the vehicle through which a significant 
percentage of e-books were sold.
Cue emphasized that Apple would only launch an e-
bookstore if it got all of the major Publishers to sign on. As 
Cue intended, each of the Publishers understood that this 
was a reference to the Big Six.168
Cue told all of the publishers that Apple was opposed to window-
ing ebooks and wanted to be able to sell ebooks at lower prices 
than their physical counterparts.169 All of the publishers told Cue 
that they were unhappy with Amazon’s $9.99 price point. Some 
confided that they were searching for ways to gain more control 
over the retail pricing of ebooks and that they previously made 
some attempts to force a change but had been unsuccessful. Cue 
told the publishers that Apple was willing to sell ebooks for prices 
up to $14.99 for new releases and best sellers.170 However, the pub-
lishers told Cue that their wholesale prices for most ebooks were in 
the $13.00 to $15.00 range, and that they wholesaled some ebooks 
for as much as $17.50. That presented a problem. Apple decided it 
would not open an ebook store if it was going to lose money, and 
166. See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 95, at 281–87; GELLHORN ET AL., supra note 
142, at 283–96.
167. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 656. According to the court of appeals, Apple said that 
it would only open an iBookstore if a critical mass of major publishers participated. United 
States v. Apple Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 302 (2d Cir. 2015).
168. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 656.
169. Id. at 657.
170. Id.
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the difference between current wholesale prices and the prices at 
which Apple thought it could successfully sell ebooks left little or 
no profit. Nevertheless, all the parties were optimistic. The pub-
lishers had a powerful incentive to bring Apple into the market, 
and, thus, to help find a way to make that possible.
Ultimately, the solution presented itself during Apple’s meeting 
with Hachette on December 15. Hachette suggested that Apple 
consider adopting an entirely different model of pricing ebooks. 
Under the then-existing wholesale model, publishers provided a 
suggested retail price (typically printed on the dustjacket or back 
cover of physical books), but retailers were free to sell the books at 
any price they desired. Hachette proposed that Apple instead em-
ploy an agency model. Under that system, publishers would set the 
retail price of the book and the retailer would receive a set per-
centage of that price as a commission. On the following day, 
HarperCollins made the same suggestion. That was not coinci-
dence; during the prior week, Hachette and HarperCollins had 
discussed exploring an agency model with Apple.171 Nor was switch-
ing to an agency model a new idea within the industry. Some pub-
lishers had previously told Amazon they wanted to switch to an
agency model—to no avail. Moreover, Barnes & Noble wanted to 
stem its own losses in ebooks by switching to an agency model, alt-
hough doing so while Amazon was still on the wholesale model 
and selling ebooks for $9.99 was not feasible.172
The agency model proposal surprised Cue, however, and he ini-
tially rejected it. Nevertheless, the agency model made sense for all 
parties for a number of reasons. First, it allowed publishers to set 
the retail price, which was something they cared very much about 
as a result of Amazon’s practice. Second, it guaranteed a reasona-
ble profit to the retailer, provided of course that the commissions
were set at a suitable level. Third, it navigated around a potentially 
thorny legal problem. The law is far from clear as to when a sup-
plier can dictate to a dealer the retail price of its product.173 How-
ever, suppliers can traditionally set the retail price for products 
sold to retailers on consignment, that is, when suppliers retain title 
171. Id. at 657 n.16.
172. Trial Transcript, United States v. Apple Inc., supra note 109, at 2441.
173. See infra notes 325–35 and accompanying text.
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to the goods and the retailers act as agents of the suppliers and are 
paid by commission upon sales to consumers.174
It is no surprise, therefore, that when Cue and his team returned 
to Cupertino and thought hard about what they had heard, they 
decided to embrace the agency model.175 The Apple team devel-
oped a proposal based on the agency model. Cue, a skilled and ex-
perienced negotiator, decided to test his proposal with three se-
lected publishers. He already knew that Hachette and HarperCol-
HarperCollins liked an agency model, so he did not need to return 
to them yet. Cue pegged Penguin’s CEO, David Shanks, as a “fol-
lower,” and therefore felt that there was little point in talking to 
him first. Cue believed that Carolyn Reidy, Simon and Shuster’s
CEO, was an industry leader, so he wanted to test his proposal with 
her. In addition, Cue decided to test his proposal with Random 
House because it was the largest and most desirable publisher. 
And, in what would prove to be an especially savvy choice, Cue de-
cided to test his proposal with Macmillan because, even though it 
was the smallest of the Big Six, it had cachet within the industry. 
Macmillan had a reputation for publishing quality books, and it 
was led by John Sargent, who came from a family with a distin-
guished history in book publishing.176
Over the following week, Cue talked individually to top execu-
tives from those three publishers. He proposed an agency model 
with a thirty percent commission to Apple. He also wanted a deal 
that included two other elements that ultimately became the larg-
est legal problems. First, Cue wanted a mechanism ensuring “some 
level of reasonable pricing.”177 Apple thought it essential that pub-
lishers price ebooks significantly below their physical book coun-
terparts. Readers expected to pay less for an ebook than for a phys-
ical book. They had become accustomed to that through Amazon’s
pricing, and they knew that ebooks saved publishers money in pa-
per, printing, and transportation costs. Thus, Cue suggested cap-
ping the retail price for new releases at $12.99.
Second, Apple needed to find a way to ensure that Amazon 
could not continue its loss-leader strategy and dramatically under-
sell Apple. The simple solution would be to require the publishers 
174. HOVENKAMP, supra note 95, at 635–39. Although Supreme Court doctrine regarding 
resale price maintenance was substantially changed in 2007, federal court decisions in 2008 
and 2009 held that the consignment exception remained viable. Id. at 639.
175. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 658.
176. Sargent’s father led Doubleday from 1963 to 1978, expanding it into an industry 
giant. Id. at 660 n.18.
177. Id. at 660.
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to agree that they would switch to the same agency model with 
Amazon, and the first draft of Apple’s agreements with publishers 
required that the publishers employ an agency model for all ebook 
retailers.178 However, Apple worried that that presented legal prob-
lems.179 So, instead, Apple included a most favored nation (MFN) 
clause in the agreements. This permitted Apple to obtain ebooks 
from publishers at thirty percent less than the lowest retail price on 
the market. Thus, if Amazon was selling an ebook for $9.99, the 
publisher would have to make that ebook available to Apple for 
$6.99, thereby allowing Apple to match Amazon’s price and receive 
its thirty percent commission. As a practical matter, that would 
compel publishers to move Amazon to an agency model—
something that most of them wanted to do anyway. 
Each of the publishers then engaged in vigorous, individual ne-
gotiations with Apple, with most of the focus on price caps. John 
Sargent of Macmillan, for example, suggested that Apple offer 
each publisher a choice between a thirty percent agency model 
without windowing or a wholesale model with windowing.180 Sar-
gent also wanted to be able to price most new releases within a 
range of $12.95 to $14.95 with the ability to price selected ebooks 
at $19.95. The other publishers also balked at the combination of a 
$12.99 price with a thirty percent cut for Apple. It left them with 
less than they wanted.181 Ultimately, however, Apple and each of 
the publishers agreed to a thirty percent commission agency model 
without windowing and with tiered price caps. For example, if a 
hardcover bestseller were priced at $30 or less, the ebook price 
would be capped at $12.99; if a hardcover bestseller was priced 
above $30.00 and up to $35.00, the ebook price would be capped 
at $14.99.182 There were similar, but not identical, tiers for other 
new releases and higher tiers of $16.99 and $19.99 for some new 
releases with higher hardback list prices. Some of the publishers 
remained less than happy with the price caps, but they concluded 
it was the best they could do. At Simon & Shuster’s request, Apple 
agreed to revisit the price caps after a year.183
178. Id. at 662–63.
179. It is unclear whether Apple thought it would be unlawful to include such a clause in 
its agreement with publishers or that such a clause would be legally unenforceable. Id. at 663 
n.23.
180. Id. at 660.
181. See id. at 661.
182. See id. at 669–70 (describing in more detail the price tiers proposed by Cue and stat-
ing that after further negotiations the publishers ultimately agreed to Cue’s proposed tiers).
183. See id. at 670.
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Although Apple negotiated individually with each publisher, it 
informed the publishers that it would ultimately offer them sub-
stantially identical deals.184 There was, meanwhile, no shortage of 
conversations among individual publishers about their discussions 
with Apple.185 By the end of January, five of the Big Six signed 
agreements with Apple. The single holdout was Random House, 
the largest publisher, and the one that Apple had considered to be 
essential at the beginning of the process.186 Random House was re-
luctant to abandon the wholesale pricing model, which provided 
higher profits, at least for the present.187 Apple informed the other 
publishers that Random House would not agree, and that it was 
willing launch its iBookstore as long as four of the Big Six signed 
on.188 The other five publishers decided they were willing to give up 
short-term profits for a more secure long-term future.
D. Confrontation
The publishers now faced the unnerving task of switching Ama-
zon to the agency model. This was, of course, something the pub-
lishers wanted to do, but it was an intimidating prospect nonethe-
less. Amazon was not only immensely powerful as the largest 
bookseller in the world, it was notorious for riding roughshod over 
those who stood in its way.189 As the district court put it, the deal 
with Apple “stiffened the spines” of the publishers to finally take 
on Amazon.190
On January 27, 2010, Apple formally announced its iPad at a
large event in San Francisco.191 Walter Mossberg, a columnist cover-
ing technology at the Wall Street Journal asked how Apple expected 
to sell iBooks for $14.99 with Amazon selling them for $9.99. 
“Well,” Jobs replied, “that won’t be the case.”192 “You mean you 
won’t be $14.99 or they won’t be $9.99?,” Mossberg asked. “The 
price will be the same,” said Jobs. “Publishers are actually withhold-
184. See id. at 664.
185. The district judge observed, “The CEOs of the Publisher Defendants made over 100 
telephone calls to one another in the short period of time between December 8, when Cue 
first contacted them, and January 26, when the Agreements were signed.” Id. at 674.
186. Id. at 656, 660.
187. See id. at 673, 677; United States v. Apple Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 308 (2d Cir. 2015).
188. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 673.
189. See generally STONE, supra note 122.
190. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 665.
191. ISAACSON, supra note 111, at 493.
192. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 679; see also ISAACSON, supra note 111, at 493.
WINTER 2019] Books and Olive Oil 303
ing their books from Amazon because they are not happy.”193 It was 
a statement that the courts would later view as a smoking gun.194
The publishers had all been invited to the iPad launch. Macmil-
lan’s John Sargent did not go. He believed that he should tell Am-
azon in person that Macmillan needed to move it to the agency 
model. So instead of flying to San Francisco to attend the iPad 
event, Sargent flew to Seattle to, as he predicted to a friend, “get 
[my] ass kicked by Amazon.”195 On January 28, Sargent and a col-
league met in a small conference room at Amazon headquarters 
with Russ Grandinetti, Amazon’s senior vice president for Kindle 
content.196 Sargent told Grandinetti that Amazon could either 
switch to an agency model or stay with a wholesale model, but un-
der the wholesale model Macmillan would window ebooks for sev-
en months (the period of time that books were designated as new 
releases and thus subject to price caps and the MFN clause under 
the Macmillan-Apple contract).197 Within twenty minutes, an angry 
Grandinetti escorted the two Macmillan executives out of the 
building.198 When Sargent arrived back in New York the next day 
he learned that “buy” buttons had been removed from all Macmil-
lan books, both print and electronic, on Amazon.com.199
As sociologist John B. Thompson describes it, over the next few 
days “many in the publishing industry were riveted to their com-
puter screens, watching in astonishment as one of the first great 
conflicts of the new digital age unfolded before them.”200 Were it 
alone, Macmillan would have been forced to capitulate, but Mac-
millan had reason to believe that other publishers would soon in-
sist that Amazon switch to the agency model.201 It had to survive in 
the meantime, however. John Sargent decided to take the dispute 
public. He took out a full-page ad in the trade publication Publish-
ers Lunch to publish an open letter to Macmillan authors and the 
literary agent community.202 Sargent recounted his meeting with 
193. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 679.
194. See id. at 679, 705; United States v. Apple Inc., 791 F.3d 348, 308, 317 (2d Cir. 2015).
195. Packer, supra note 79, at 72.
196. Id.; Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 679.
197. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 679.
198. Packer, supra note 79, at 72.
199. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 679; Jay Yarow, Macmillan CEO Takes Out a Full Page Ad 
to Explain His War With Amazon, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 31, 2010, 11:45 AM), http://www.
businessinsider.com/macmillan-ceo-takes-out-a-full-page-ad-to-explain-his-war-with-amazon-
2010-1.
200. THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 375.
201. “I had no doubt that others would eventually follow,” Sargent wrote to a friend a 
few days later. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 680.
202. Yarow, supra note 199.
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Amazon in Seattle and how Amazon responded by removing Mac-
millan books from the Amazon.com and Kindle websites. Sargent 
continued:
In the ink-and-paper world we sell books to retailers far 
and wide on a business model that provides a level playing 
field, and allows all retailers the possibility of selling books 
profitably. Looking to the future and to a growing digital 
business, we need to establish the same sort of business 
model, one that encourages new devices and new stores. 
One that encourages healthy competition. One that is ra-
tional and stable. It also needs to insure that intellectual 
property can be widely available digitally at a price that is 
both fair to the consumer and allows those who create it 
and publish it to be fairly compensated . . . .
The agency model would allow Amazon to make more 
money selling our books, not less. We would make less 
money in our dealings with Amazon under the new model. 
Our disagreement is not about short-term profitability but 
rather about long-term viability and stability of the digital 
book market.203
The dispute got wide publicity, both in the trade and main-
stream press. Even many Amazon customers were outraged at its 
brutality.204 Amazon stock fell nine percent.205 By Sunday night, 
Amazon announced it was throwing in the towel, though it did not 
restore buy buttons for Macmillan titles for several more days.206
The five publishers all switched to agency models with Amazon by 
summer. Meanwhile, the publishers also switched to an agency 
model with Barnes & Noble, which was only too happy to make the 
switch.207
Random House remained a holdout. Amazon rewarded it by 
promoting its titles heavily. “When you go on the Kindle website, it 
could be the Random House homepage,” remarked Penguin’s
CEO.208 But in March of 2011, Random House also adopted an 
203. Id.
204. Cf. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 680.
205. Id.
206. Motoko Rich & Brad Stone, Macmillan Books Still Mostly Absent From Amazon.com, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 2, 2010, 2:19 PM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/02/macmillan-
books-still-mostly-absent-from-amazoncom/.
207. See Trial Transcript, United States v. Apple Inc., supra note 109, at 2178–81.
208. Id. at 2160.
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agency model with all three of the major ebooksellers.209 Amazon 
tried to maintain wholesale contracts with smaller publishers, but 
that began to fall apart, as well.210 Amazon complained to the FTC 
that it was the victim of a conspiracy among Apple and the five 
publishers.
II. U.S. V. APPLE: THE COURT DECISIONS
On April 11, 2012, the federal government filed a civil action 
against Apple and the five publishers.211 As the government saw it, 
Amazon was a boon to readers. “E-book sales have been increasing 
rapidly ever since Amazon released its first Kindle device in No-
vember of 2007,” the complaint alleged.212 “One of Amazon’s most 
successful marketing strategies was to lower substantially the price
of newly released and bestselling e-books to $9.99.”213 According to 
the government, Apple and the publishers had conspired to end 
that beneficial state of affairs and fix prices. “Defendants were de-
termined to end the robust retail price competition in e-books that 
prevailed, to the benefit of consumers” and “raise the prices con-
sumers pay for e-books through the adoption of identical pricing 
tiers.”214 The complaint noted that prices for ebooks published by 
the defendants had risen to $12.99 or $14.99.215 The government 
209. THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 375; see also Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 685–86.
210. In March 2010, the Perseus Book Group signed an agency contract with Apple that 
presumably had the same MFN clause. Though much smaller than the Big Six, Perseus pub-
lished books under a number of highly-regarded imprints, including Basic Books and Public 
Affairs. Even more importantly for Amazon, Perseus served as the distributor for more than 
three hundred smaller publishers. In 2016, Perseus was itself acquired by Hachette. Motoko 
Rich & Brad Stone, Amazon Threatens Publishers as Apple Looms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2010, at 
B1, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/18/technology/internet/18amazon.html; Motoko 
Rich & Brad Stone, Perseus Signs an EBooks Deal for the iPad, N.Y. TIMES: MEDIA DECODER
(Mar. 22, 2010, 1:22 PM), https://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/22/perseus-
signs-an-ebooks-deal-for-the-ipad/?_r=0. See generally THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 179.
211. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 645. Forty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and six 
U.S. territories and possessions filed a parens patriae action, and representative private plain-
tiffs filed two class actions, against Apple and the publishers. All of the actions were consoli-
dated in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Id. at 645 n.1. For 
simplicity’s sake, I shall call plaintiff “the government,” referring to the federal government 
only.
212. Complaint ¶ 2, United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 
2012) (No. 12 CV 2826), ECF No. 1, 2012 WL 1193205.
213. Id.
214. Id. ¶ 5.
215. Id. ¶ 92.
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asserted that Apple and the defendants had violated section 1 of 
the Sherman Act216 by conspiring to fix prices for ebooks.217
“The Government sides with monopoly, rather than competi-
tion, in bringing this case,” Apple declared in its answer. “The 
Government starts from the false premise that an eBooks ‘market’
was characterized by ‘robust price competition” prior to Apple’s
entry.” 218 In fact, there had been no real competition in the ebook 
market—only Amazon, which had been selling nearly ninety per-
cent of all ebooks.219 Apple argued that its entry into the market 
had benefitted consumers by bringing Amazon’s monopoly to an 
end. Although Amazon still enjoyed a dominant share in the 
ebook market, it was “now forced to compete with Apple, Barnes & 
Noble, and others.”220
All of the publishers settled, and the case proceeded to trial 
against Apple alone.
A. The District Court
Following a nearly three-week-long bench trial, Judge Denise 
Cote issued her opinion on July 10, 2013.221 She found that
Apple knowingly and intentionally participated and facili-
tated a horizontal conspiracy to eliminate retail price com-
petition and to raise the retail prices of e-books. Apple 
made a conscious commitment to join a scheme with Pub-
lisher Defendants to raise the prices of ebooks.222
Judge Cote considered the MFN clause to be a critical tool of the 
conspiracy. She conceded that MFN agreements may be entirely 
lawful.223 After all, MFNs generally lower prices. Apple had argued 
that lowering prices was, in fact, the sole purpose of the MFN 
clauses. If Apple discovered that another retailer was selling an 
ebook at a price lower than the retail price set for Apple by the 
216. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
217. Complaint, supra note 212, ¶¶ 94–95.
218. Apple Inc.’s Answer at 1, United States. v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y.
May 22, 2012) (No. 12-CV-2826), ECF No. 54, 2012 WL 1862008.
219. Id. at 2.
220. Id. at 3.
221. United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 791 F.3d 
290 (2d Cir. 2015).
222. Id. at 697.
223. Id. at 698.
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publisher, Apple had a right to match that price.224 That would 
have been perfectly acceptable, Apple argued. It could happily 
make profits selling ebooks at $9.99 as long as it received a thirty 
percent commission.225 Although Judge Cote agreed that one pur-
pose of the MFN was to allow Apple to meet a lower price, she 
found that it also had a second purpose: to insure that the publish-
ers would switch Amazon and other ebook distributors to an agen-
cy model.226 This switch would raise prices,227 which is what Apple 
and the publishers intended228 and, in fact, occurred.229 Judge Cote 
rejected Apple’s argument that there was no violation as long as 
the MFN had one lawful purpose.230 “The issue is not whether an 
entity executed an agency agreement or used an MFN, but whether 
it conspired to raise prices,” she wrote.231
Judge Cote also found that the publishers expressly agreed 
among themselves to all move Amazon to an agency model and 
that they did so at Apple’s insistence. The strongest evidence she 
described to support that finding involved the following sequence 
of events. On January 20, John Sargent, Macmillan’s CEO, and 
Russell Grandinetti, an Amazon senior executive, had lunch.232
(This was one week before the previously-described meeting be-
tween the two, when Sargent passed up the iPad launch and in-
stead flew to Seattle to “get [my] ass kicked by Amazon.”233) At that 
meeting, Sargent told Grandinetti that Macmillan would give Ama-
zon the option of choosing between the agency or wholesale mod-
els. “But, Sargent was mistaken,” Judge Cote wrote in her opin-
ion.234 “Neither Apple nor his fellow Publisher Defendants would 
allow Amazon the option of remaining on a wholesale model.”235
That evening, Sargent and Apple’s Eddy Cue had dinner. Judge 
Cote believed that at dinner Sargent told Cue about his lunch with 
224. See Trial Transcript, United States v. Apple Inc., supra note 109, at 2483.
225. Id. at 2490–91, 2496–97, 2519.
226. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 692.
227. The essence of the conspiracy, Judge Cote wrote, was that Apple and publishers 
joined together “to eliminate Amazon’s power to set retail prices and then to raise prices to 
the point that Apple would permit.” Id. at 705.
228. Judge Cote wrote: “The evidence is overwhelming that Apple knew of the unlawful 
aims of the conspiracy and joined that conspiracy with the specific intent to help it succeed.”
Id. at 700.
229. Id. at 682–83.
230. Id. at 701 n.65.
231. Id. at 672.
232. Id. at 672.
233. Id. at 679; see supra note 195 and accompanying text.
234. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 672.
235. Id.
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Grandinetti, and Cue explained to Sargent how the MFN clause ef-
fectively required Macmillan to move Amazon to the agency mod-
el.236 The next morning Cue called Carol Reidy of Simon & Shuster 
and Brian Murray of HarperCollins, and following those calls, 
Reidy and Murray called Sargent. Cote believed that Cue “enlisted”
Reidy and Murray to intercede with Sargent.237 “The straight talk 
from Reidy, Murray, and Cue worked,” Judge Cote concluded.238
“Sargent called Grandinetti immediately after hanging up with 
Reidy, and told him that the Apple contract ‘required’ Macmillan 
to offer Amazon the agency model only.”239 Both Sargent and Cue 
denied that Cue had told Sargent that Macmillan was required to 
move Amazon to the agency model, but Judge Cote found that nei-
ther Sargent nor Cue was credible.240
A price fixing conspiracy is illegal per se, and thus, in Judge
Cote’s view, that was that.241 She added, however, that if Apple’s
conduct was analyzed under the rule of reason, the result would be 
the same because Apple’s agreements with the publishers had no 
procompetitive effects.242
This was a stunning finding. No procompetitive effects? What 
about the fact that before Apple’s entry into the market, Amazon 
was a monopolist in ebook retailing market and, moreover, that it 
maintained that position through predatory pricing? Judge Cote 
acknowledged that Apple was a new competitor in ebook retailing, 
but she did not think its entry meaningfully increased competition. 
She wrote:
Apple demanded, as a precondition of its entry into the 
market, that it would not have to compete with Amazon on 
price. Thus, from the consumer’s perspective—a not un-
important perspective in the field of antitrust—the arrival 
236. See id.
237. Id. at 673. Reidy denied having any conversations with any of the other Big Six pub-
lishers about moving Amazon to the agency contract. Trial Transcript, United States v. Ap-
ple Inc., supra note 109, at 455–56. She admitted that Cue told her that Simon & Schuster 
had to get all other retailers to switch to the agency model. Id. at 500–01, 520. However, 
when asked whether the MFN clause in the Apple contract forced Simon & Shuster to move 
Amazon and other retailers to the agency contract, Reidy said that that was “the wrong con-
clusion.” Id. at 533–34. “We wanted to do it. It had nothing to do with whether Apple made 
it a demand or not,” she explained. Id. at 505.
238. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 673.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 672 n.38.
241. Id. at 694.
242. The government had shown “that the Agreements did not promote competition, 
but destroyed it,” wrote Judge Cote. Id.
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of the iBookstore brought less price competition and high-
er prices.243
Besides, if Apple thought that Amazon was monopolizing the 
ebook market through predatory pricing, its remedy was to com-
plain to law enforcement agencies or file its own civil lawsuit. An-
other company’s illegal behavior does not excuse engaging in ille-
gal activity oneself, reasoned Judge Cote, and thus whether 
Amazon had been violating the antitrust laws was not her prob-
lem.244
B. The Second Circuit
1. The Majority
On appeal, the Second Circuit’s three-judge panel split. Judge 
Debra Ann Livingston wrote the majority opinion. As she saw it, 
Apple and the publishers acted collectively to achieve a common 
goal of raising ebook prices.245 The court saw the conduct of Apple 
and the publishers in terms of a classic hub-and-spoke price-fixing 
conspiracy.246 The hub was Apple and the spokes were the five pub-
lishers. The distinction between independent and concerted action 
is fundamental to antitrust analysis.247 Apple was permitted to act 
independently to negotiate and sign agreements with individual 
publishers at whatever prices Apple and each individual publisher 
found acceptable. Apple was also permitted to ask publishers to
sign identical agreements and to tell each publisher what it was do-
ing, provided that Apple was acting independently and in its own 
interests. However, Apple could not lawfully be either a ringmaster 
or an agent of a conspiracy among competitors. The issue in hub-
and-spoke cases is whether there were agreements around the rim 
of the wheel—among the publishers—to create agreements that 
fixed prices.248
243. Id. at 708.
244. “This trial has not been the occasion to decide whether Amazon’s choice to sell 
NYT Bestsellers or other New Releases as loss leaders was an unfair trade practice or in any 
other way a violation of law,” Judge Cote wrote. Id.
245. United States v. Apple Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 317 (2d Cir. 2015).
246. Id. at 314.
247. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 760–61 (1984).
248. See, e.g., Howard Hess Dental Labs., Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, 602 F.3d 237, 255 (3d Cir. 
2010).
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The court concluded that “ample evidence identified by the dis-
trict court established both that the Publisher Defendants’ shifting 
to an agency model with Amazon was the result of express collu-
sion among them and that Apple consciously played a key role in 
organizing that collusion.”249 Key evidence was the MFN, which was 
specifically designed to persuade the publishers to act collectively 
to switch Amazon to agency agreements. “Indeed,” wrote the court, 
“the MFN’s capacity for forcing collective action by the publishers 
was precisely what enabled Jobs to predict with confidence that 
‘the price will be the same’ on the iBookstore and the Kindle when 
he announced the launch of the iPad.”250
The court noted that “Apple never seriously argues that the Pub-
lisher Defendants were not acting in concert.”251 That was correct. 
Apple argued that the government had not met its burden of prov-
ing that the publishers had engaged in a conspiracy to raise prices, 
but that was as far as it went.252 In his closing summation Apple’s
counsel said “we do not have an opinion one way or another,”
about whether the publishers had engaged in a horizontal price-
fixing conspiracy among themselves.253 We only know what we 
know, Apple essentially argued, and we don’t know what the pub-
lishers were doing among themselves without telling us. That posi-
tion was an interesting tactical choice because it comes dangerous-
ly close to conceding that the publishers had engaged in a 
horizontal price-fixing conspiracy. Indeed, that tactical decision 
may have been decisive in persuading the trial and appellate judg-
es that there had been a conspiracy.254
But what was the evidence that the publishers conspired to fix 
prices? As with the district judge, the court of appeals made much 
of the many conversations among the publishers.255 It was, however, 
not unlawful for publishers to talk among themselves as long as 
they did not agree to fix prices or collectively engage in other activ-
ity that unreasonably restrained trade.256 Rather than identifying 
249. Apple Inc., 791 F.3d at 316.
250. Id. at 317.
251. Id. at 318.
252. Trial Transcript, United States v. Apple Inc., supra note 109, at 2525–28.
253. Id. at 2458.
254. “I think that the critical question is, in terms of Apple’s liability, whether Apple was 
aware of such a horizontal conspiracy,” Apple’s counsel stated. “Oh, I agree with that, abso-
lutely,” Judge Cote responded. Id.
255. See, e.g., Apple Inc., 791 F.3d at 318 (“That the Publisher Defendants were in con-
stant communication regarding their negotiations with both Apple and Amazon can hardly 
be disputed.”).
256. See infra notes 273–74 and accompanying text.
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anything unlawful or even problematic in those conversations, the 
court merely states, “Indeed, Apple never seriously argues that the 
Publisher Defendants were not acting in concert.”257
As Judge Livingston saw it, the publishers’ objective was princi-
pally, if not solely, to raise the price of ebooks. She wrote, “[f]aced 
with downward pressure on prices but unconvinced that withhold-
ing books from Amazon was a viable strategy, the Publisher De-
fendants—their coordination orchestrated by Apple—combined 
forces to grab control over price.”258 But Judge Livingston’s opin-
ion becomes murky about precisely who wanted to raise prices and 
who wanted the price caps. “This control over pricing facilitated
their ultimate goal of raising ebook prices to the price caps,” she 
wrote.259 To whom does “their” refer? Since “their” is plural, it can-
not refer to Apple alone. Yet the evidence was that Apple imposed 
the price caps against the wishes of the publishers.260 Moreover, 
price caps were solely in Apple’s interest. Publishers set the retail 
prices in the wholesale model, and price caps restricted their dis-
cretion. 
Although she did not say so clearly, Judge Livingston seemed to 
accept Judge Cote’s conclusion that the price caps were not truly 
ceilings imposed by Apple but rather a camouflaged price-fixing 
agreement among the publishers.261 She wrote that the publishers 
“had grown accustomed to a business in which they rarely compet-
ed with one another on price,” and that they wanted to regain con-
trol over pricing and use that control to facilitate “their ultimate 
goal of raising ebook prices to the price caps.”262 This rather 
obliquely suggests that the publishers established the caps and that 
they intended them to be not merely caps but the actual retail 
prices. Judge Livingston’s thinking probably came from this state-
ment by Judge Cote in her opinion below, “[a]s the Publisher De-
fendants’ CEOs testified, the Publishers did not compete with each 
other on price; while they were serious competitors, their pre-
257. Apple Inc., 791 F.3d at 318.
258. Id. at 327.
259. Id. (emphasis added).
260. See, e.g., Trial Transcript, United States v. Apple Inc., supra note 109, at 396 (testi-
mony from David Shanks, Chief Executive Officer, Penguin Group U.S.A., who stated, “We 
wanted no price caps.”); Apple Inc.id. at 1803 (testimony from Eddy Cue, Senior Vice Presi-
dent of Internet Software and Services for Apple Inc., who stated that he proposed price 
caps).
261. See supra notes 258–59 and accompanying text.
262. Apple Inc., 791 F.3d at 327.
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ferred fields of competition were over authors and agents.”263 Judg-
es Livingston and Cote seemed to believe that the publishers did 
not compete on price because of some kind of agreement among 
them, but the judges misunderstood what the publishers were say-
ing.
Because of the unique nature of the book business, publishers 
do not really compete on price—or at least do not compete on 
price in the same way as producers of most other products.264 Con-
sider someone shopping for extra virgin olive oil in the supermar-
ket. There are many brands on the shelf in front of him, and he 
does not have a strong brand preference.265 Price may well be the 
determining factor.266 The more fungible the product, the more 
price is likely to be controlling. Nothing is less fungible than 
books. Each book is unique. A Tana French fan wants to read 
French’s latest mystery, Trespasser, not just any mystery. If she finds 
the hardback version too pricey at $19.12, she might decide to wait 
for the paperback, purchase the ebook version, or borrow Trespass-
er from the library. She is, however, unlikely to substitute Sue Graf-
ton’s most recent mystery because its hardback version is selling for 
$17.40.267 When Tana French’s publisher, Penguin, decided how to 
price Trespasser, it considered how to maximize total revenue from 
all of the versions of the book that it would ultimately release. It 
263. United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 791 F.3d 
290 (2d Cir. 2015).
264. Cf. Trial Transcript, United States v. Apple Inc., supra note 109, at 383 (testimony 
from David Shanks, who stated, “Sometimes we would need to compete on price,” but sug-
gesting this is something of a rarity).
265. He may or may not be aware that the representations made on olive oil labels are 
notoriously unreliable. See, e.g., Larry Olmstead, It’s Extra Virgin Olive Oil Day—Is Your EVOO 
Real or Fake?, FORBES (Sep. 30, 2016, 9:24 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/larryolmsted/
2016/09/30/its-extra-virgin-olive-oil-day-is-your-evoo-real-or-fake.
266. This does not necessarily mean the customer selects the least expensive brand. She 
may assume price is correlated with quality.
267. These are the actual prices offered by Barnes & Noble on the day I write this for 
Trespasser and Grafton’s newest book, Y is for Yesterday. There are, of course, readers who will 
select one of those two books despite never having previously read French or Grafton, but 
price is unlikely to be determinative for those readers as well. Most will make the choice 
based on reviews, recommendations from friends, or plot descriptions and blurbs on the 
dust jackets. The $1.62 price differential will not drive the decision. On the other hand, 
price may affect a choice among similar books by a particular author. For example, based on 
a glowing review of Glass House, the latest novel by mystery writer Louise Penny, whom I had
never previously read, I decided to try her. I often read mysteries on my Nook. Rather than 
spending $14.99 for the Nook version of Glass House, I instead purchased the Nook version 
of Penny’s previous novel A Trick of the Light for $2.99. Why so cheap? A Trick of the Light re-
ceived critical acclaim, and it may be one of Penny’s best mysteries. My guess is that either 
Barnes & Noble or Penny’s publisher wanted to encourage readers like me to try one of 
Penny’s best books in the hope of making a new Penny fan who will wind up buying more of 
her fourteen novels.
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asked itself whether pricing the hardback at a particular level 
would cause too many readers to forgo purchasing that version in 
favor of waiting for the paperback or visiting the library.268 This 
consideration, more than the prices of other books, drives a pub-
lisher’s pricing decision.
Judge Livingston saw the facts much as Judge Cote had below. 
“Apple consciously played a key role in organizing” a horizontal 
price-fixing conspiracy among the publishers,” she wrote.269 But, 
once again, what was the evidence that the publishers and Apple 
had conversations that could properly be characterized as price fix-
ing? Judge Livingston, like Judge Cote below, seemed to assume 
that conversations among publishers were nefarious for the simple 
reason that they were rivals.270 Judge Livingston observed, “[w]hen 
time ran short, Apple coordinated phone calls between publishers 
who had agreed to join and those who remained on the fence.”271
But was it unlawful for Apple, which had a legitimate self-interest 
in wanting a critical mass of publishers to participate in its 
iBookstore, to ask one publisher to help persuade other publishers 
to participate?
Apple, of course, understood that the publishers wanted to end 
Amazon’s below-cost pricing of ebooks. It also understood that the 
publishers were afraid to take on Amazon over that issue alone. 
There is little doubt that Apple wanted to take advantage of that
fear. Like Judge Cote, Judge Livingston believed that Apple de-
ployed the MFN to force the publishers to act collectively to switch 
268. See Trial Transcript, United States v. Apple Inc., supra note 109, at 336 (testimony 
from David Shanks, Chief Executive Officer, Penguin Group U.S.A, who explained this in 
general terms; the specific examples of Trespasser and Y is for Yesterday are mine).
269. United States v. Apple Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 318 (2d Cir. 2015).
270. Admittedly, that assumption received a bit of support from skillful cross-
examination by the government. As previously discussed, there were a series of dinners 
among CEOs of the Big Six publishers. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. The CEO 
of the Penguin Group parent company attended those meetings. At trial, government’s
counsel asked that man’s subordinate, CEO of the subsidiary Penguin U.S.A., “Do you find it 
odd that your boss from London would be in the United States, in New York, at meetings 
with the CEOs of your principal rivals and not telling you about it? Do you find that odd as 
you sit here today?” The witness answered: “I guess so, yes.” Rather than asking why he might 
consider that odd, counsel reminded the witness (and the court) that the man who attended 
the dinners was the one who made the final decision to switch to agency contracts, and then 
quickly switched to another topic. Trial Transcript, United States v. Apple Inc., supra note 
109, at 358 (testimony from David Shanks). The careful reader will recognize, however, that 
the cross-examiner deftly deployed innuendo and nothing more.
271. Apple Inc., 791 F.3d at 319. Although Apple disputed that it had encouraged com-
munications among the publishers, the district court found that Apple had in fact done so. 
Id. at 319 n.18.
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Amazon to an agency model.272 As Judge Livingston herself recog-
nized, a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act requires “a con-
scious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an un-
lawful objective.”273 Collective action by the publishers, whether on 
their own initiative, at Apple’s inducement, or a combination of 
the two, only matters if they collaborated to achieve an illegal ob-
jective. Judge Livingston believed that the unlawful objective was 
“the goal of raising ebook prices.”274 However, that brings us to the 
key question: Was it unlawful for the publishers to act collectively 
to end Amazon’s practice of below-cost—and, arguably, predato-
ry—pricing? That question was never clearly framed, let alone ad-
dressed, by either the district court or the Second Circuit.
“Horizontal price-fixing conspiracies traditionally have been, 
and remain, the ‘archetypical example’ of a per se unlawful restraint 
on trade,” Judge Livingston wrote.275 True enough. But if this was a 
price-fixing conspiracy at all, it most certainly was not an archetypi-
cal one.
The Second Circuit brought cookie-cutter analysis to a unique 
set of facts. For example, it inferred that a conspiracy existed from 
parallel action by the publishers demanding that Amazon switch to 
an agency model.276 The court recognized, however, that parallel 
action by itself is not sufficient. When there is parallel action by ri-
vals, there must also be a good reason to infer that they were acting 
in parallel as a result of an explicit or implicit agreement to do so 
and not merely because they were doing the same thing because 
they each concluded it was in their individual interest to do so.277
Sometimes collaboration can be inferred from one member of the 
alleged conspiracy acting against its own self-interest. Take, for ex-
ample, an alleged price-fixing conspiracy in which there are five 
manufacturers of widgets who all sell their widgets for $10.00 each. 
One company has an excessive inventory of widgets and a desper-
ate need for cash. Widgets are moving slowly and are generally sold 
272. The purpose of the MFN, she wrote, was to “entice a critical mass of publish-
ers . . . collectively to shift Amazon to agency.” Id. at 317.
273. Id. (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984)
(emphasis added)).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 321.
276. Although the court of appeals made much of the publishers’ parallel action, it ne-
glected to explicitly identify which parallel action it was focused on. Presumably, it was their 
parallel action in requesting that Amazon switch to the agency model.
277. The court itself recognized this. See Apple Inc., 791 F.3d at 315 (noting that addi-
tional circumstances, or “plus factors,” in addition to parallel action, can prove an antitrust 
conspiracy).
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in lots of 500 or less. A customer offers to purchase 10,000 widgets 
for $95,000.00 ($9.50 each). The company would make a profit, 
and the sale would eliminate the need for it to borrow $95,000.00
at a high interest rate. It is in the company’s interest to make the 
sale, yet it does not do so. It is possible to infer that the firm de-
clined to make the sale because it was party to a price-fixing 
agreement.
Attempting to follow that logic, the court of appeals noted the 
following: “Under Apple’s proposed agency model, the publishers 
stood to make less money per sale than under their wholesale 
agreements with Amazon, but the Publisher Defendants were will-
ing to stomach this loss because the model allowed them to sell 
new releases and bestsellers for more than $9.99.”278 The court 
characterized the conduct of the publishers and Apple as a classic 
hub-and-spokes price-fixing conspiracy.279 The court noted that 
such conspiracies are unlawful per se because they “always or almost 
always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.”280 But 
what kind of price-fixing conspiracy is it if the participants are plot-
ting to decrease their profits?281 It is certainly not a classic price-
fixing conspiracy. One ought to wonder whether it is an unlawful 
price-fixing conspiracy at all.282
After concluding that Apple’s conduct constituted a per se viola-
tion of the Sherman Act, Judge Livingston, writing for herself 
278. Id. at 316 (emphasis added).
279. See, e.g., id. at 322 (analogizing the facts in the case at hand to those in United States 
v. General Motors, 384 U.S. 127 (1966), and mentioning that the Supreme Court character-
ized the latter as a “classic conspiracy”); id. at 326 (analogizing the facts in the case at hand 
to those in Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980) and mentioning that the 
Supreme Court characterized the latter as an “‘archetypal example’ of a per se unlawful re-
straint of trade”); id. at 327 (stating “[t]he conspiracy among Apple and the Publisher De-
fendants comfortably qualifies as a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy” that deserves to be 
condemned as per se unlawful).
280. Id. at 322 (quoting Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 
877, 886 (2007)).
281. It has long been accepted that “[a]ny combination which tampers with price struc-
tures is engaged in an unlawful activity,” regardless of whether the goal is to raise, lower, or 
maintain prices. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940). Regard-
less of how they may seek to manipulate prices, however, we expect that the goal of partici-
pants in a price-fixing conspiracy is to maximize profits.
282. This is sufficiently unusual that, even if the publishers agreed to try to raise prices, 
the courts should have evaluated their conduct under the rule of reason. See, e.g., Broad.
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) (“[It] is only after considera-
ble experience with certain business relationships that courts should classify them as per se
violations.”) (quoting United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607–08 (1972)).
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alone,283 went on to decide that Apple’s conduct also failed a 
“quick look” rule of reason analysis.284 Courts use quick look when 
a defendant has employed a type of restraint that is considered un-
reasonable on its face—such as, in this case, price fixing—but has 
done so in an unusual way or in unusual market context.285 Judge 
Livingston employed the quick look analysis by assuming that Ap-
ple’s conduct had an actual adverse effect on competition but giv-
ing Apple the opportunity to prove that its conduct had procom-
petitive justifications.286
Apple’s main procompetitive justification was that its contracts 
with publishers allowed it and other ebook retailers to enter a 
market previously dominated by a single firm. To Judge Livingston, 
this was tantamount to saying “that higher prices enable more 
competitors to enter a market.”287 Apple’s complaints about Ama-
zon’s $9.99 price point were whining by a less efficient firm.288
Judge Livingston was unmoved by the fact that Amazon had been 
pricing ebooks below cost, thereby creating a barrier to rivals en-
tering the market.289
Echoing Judge Cote’s opinion below, Judge Livingston wrote 
that if Apple or the publishers thought that Amazon’s pricing vio-
lated the antitrust laws, they should have sued Amazon for monop-
olizing the ebook market.290 There are, however, at least two seri-
ous problems with that analysis.
283. Apple Inc., 791 F.3d at 339–40 (Lohier, J., concurring). Judge Raymond J. Lohier, 
who joined the first part of Judge Livingston’s opinion, believed that the case should be de-
termined on a per se analysis and a rule of reason analysis should not be undertaken. Id.
284. Whether there is, in fact, a well-defined quick look analysis is debatable. See Califor-
nia Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779 (1999) (“The truth is that our categories of analy-
sis of anticompetitive effect are less fixed than terms like ‘per se,’ ‘quick look,’ and ‘rule of 
reason’ tend to make them appear.”); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 95, at 349 (“The Court 
has used the term [quick look] in only three decisions, and has rejected its application on 
all three.”).
285. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 95, at 347–48.
286. Apple Inc., 791 F.3d at 330. Judge Livingston emphasized that although she was re-
lieving the government of the burden of showing, through a full market analysis, that Ap-
ple’s conduct had an anticompetitive effect, she was nonetheless giving Apple’s procompeti-
tive justifications as much attention as she would under a full rule of reason analysis. Id. at 
329–30.
287. Id. at 330.
288. See id. at 333 (asking, rhetorically, whether “it is desirable to require more efficient 
competitors to charge the same as their less efficient rivals solely so the latter will be spared 
the indignity of not charging the best price?”)
289. See id. Judge Livingston contrasted Apple’s unwillingness to enter a market in which 
Amazon was pricing below cost with Barnes & Noble, which had done exactly that, but she 
was insensitive to the business necessity that left Barnes & Noble little choice but to enter 
the ebook market, even if it would to lose money. See supra notes 127–30 and accompanying 
text.
290. Id. at 332.
WINTER 2019] Books and Olive Oil 317
First, it is unclear whether Apple or the publishers had standing 
to sue. Only parties injured in “their business or property” have 
standing to bring antitrust claims.291 Arguably, the publishers were 
not injured because they made profits on their sales to Amazon. 
Their profits, moreover, were unaffected by Amazon’s retail pric-
ing. Publishers were gravely concerned that Amazon’s pricing 
threatened book publishing in the long run, but courts would al-
most certainly consider those concerns too remote and contingent 
to constitute an injury for antitrust standing purposes.292 If any-
thing, Apple had an even more serious standing problem. Alt-
hough courts liberally find that injured competitors have standing, 
Apple was not Amazon’s competitor before it actually entered the 
market. It was not in the ebook business; it was merely contemplat-
ing entering that business. This is called the problem of the unes-
tablished business.293 It is one thing, for example, for a widget seller 
in New York to sue a rival for preventing it from expanding into 
New England by selling widgets there below cost, but it is quite an-
other thing for a firm not in the widget business at all to make that 
complaint. Courts generally find that an unestablished business 
lacks standing unless, at a minimum, it made substantial expendi-
tures in preparation to enter the market before the defendant frus-
trated its plans through allegedly unlawful conduct.294 This does 
not mean that Apple and publishers indisputably lacked standing 
to sue, but at a minimum they would have faced serious standing 
issues at the outset of a monopolization case against Amazon, di-
minishing the feasibility of the litigation alternative.
Second, putting aside the question of whether a lawsuit was fea-
sible, why should a party oppressed by another party’s unlawful an-
titrust practices not challenge those practices in the marketplace if 
it has the ability to do so? Why require litigation rather than self-
help?295 Judges Cote and Livingston were too dismissive of the ar-
291. See Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2018).
292. See, e.g., Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 n.13 (1982) (sug-
gesting that traditional proximate cause concepts apply, such as whether the connection 
between defendant’s conduct and plaintiff’s injury is remote or tenuous); Illinois Brick Co. 
v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 748 n.2 (1977) (“There is, of course, a point beyond which antitrust 
defendants should not be held responsible for the remote consequences of their actions.”)
293. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 95, at 825–26.
294. See, e.g., id. at 825.
295. Judge Jacobs made a similar point in dissent when he observed that it would not 
have been feasible for Apple to challenge Amazon’s predatory pricing through litigation 
and then added: “More fundamentally, litigation is not a market alternative . . . . A require-
ment that potential market entrants litigate instead of enter the market on restrictive (but 
legal and reasonable) terms, would license monopoly for the duration.” Apple Inc., 791 F.3d 
at 352 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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gument that it was reasonable for Apple to fight fire with fire, that 
is, for Apple to engage in questionable conduct to destroy a mo-
nopoly protected by predatory pricing. “Another company’s al-
leged violation of antitrust laws is not an excuse for engaging in 
your own violation of law,” Judge Cote wrote.296 That is, at best, too 
absolute a statement. The law often finds violations of law to be jus-
tified. Criminal law recognizes a lesser-evil or necessity defense, 
under which one may be forgiven for violating the law if adhering 
to it would have resulted in greater harm. Lesser-evil questions are 
very controversial. Lawyers, philosophers, and ethicists vigorously 
debate such questions as whether one may throw a switch to divert 
a train from one track on which it will kill ten people to another 
track on which it will kill one person, or whether it is permissible to 
torture a terrorist to force him to reveal the location of a ticking 
time bomb.297 Nevertheless, the lesser-evil defense is widely recog-
nized in the criminal law.298 Other areas of the law have similar 
doctrines. Tort law, for example, recognizes that one may not be 
liable for conduct that is generally tortious when the available al-
ternatives would have been worse for social welfare.299 The balanc-
ing of harms is generally a principal focus of these doctrines.300
296. United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 791 F.3d 
290 (2d Cir. 2015). Although Judge Cote did not cite it, some believe Fashion Originators’
Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), stands for the proposition that firms victimized 
by unlawful conduct cannot collectively engage in unlawful conduct themselves in an effort 
to protect themselves. However, Fashion Originators’ is very different from United States v. Ap-
ple. In Fashion Originators’, the 136 manufacturers that comprised the defendant Guild occu-
pied a “commanding position” in the industry. Id. at 462. Their market share in one seg-
ment of the industry exceeded sixty percent. Id. The Guild and its members were seeking to 
preserve their commanding position, whereas Apple and the publishers were challenging 
Amazon’s commanding position and seeking to bring more competition to the market.
297. See, e.g., TORTURE: A COLLECTION (Sanford Levinson rev. ed. 2006) (wherein vari-
ous contributors address both hypotheticals). Reality struck far too close to the latter hypo-
thetical when lawyers in President George W. Bush’s administration wrote legal memoranda 
to justify torturing of prisoners. They accomplished their goal by defining torture as only 
those things that cause bodily injury that rises “to the level of death, organ failure, or the 
permanent impairment of a significant body function.” See Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 753 
(9th Cir. 2011).
298. MODEL PENAL CODE § 302 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). More 
than twenty states have lesser-evil defenses (also referred to as choice-of-evil and necessity 
defenses in their criminal codes); George Christie, The Defense of Necessity Considered From the 
Legal and Moral Points of View, 48 DUKE L.J. 975, 1025 (1999).
299. See, e.g., Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69 (1853) (holding that defendant was not liable 
for destroying plaintiff’s home to stop the progress of fire threatening an entire city); Zeni v. 
Anderson, 243 N.W.2d 270 (Mich. 1976) (holding that because of heavy snowfall defendant 
had an excuse for violating a statute that made it unlawful to walk in the road rather than on 
the sidewalk); Harrison v. Wisdom, 53 Tenn. 99 (1872) (holding that defendants were not 
liable for destroying all the liquor in town before the arrival of the Union army).
300. See John T. Parry, The Virtue of Necessity: Reshaping Culpability and the Rule of Law, 36 
HOUS. L. REV. 397, 408 (1999); Adav Noti, Note, The Uplifted Knife: Morality, Justification, and 
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Antitrust law considers balancing of harms in an even more fun-
damental way: it is an integral part of evaluating whether a party’s
conduct should be deemed unlawful under a rule of reason analy-
sis. Under a rule of reason analysis, conduct is not deemed unlaw-
ful when its benefits outweigh its harms.301 Moreover, conduct that 
has significant virtues should always be evaluated under the rule of 
reason and never condemned as unlawful per se.302 The Supreme 
Court’s 2007 decision in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. 
PSKS, Inc.303 reinforced this concept. The Court decided that 
whether resale price maintenance is to be deemed lawful or unlaw-
ful depends upon whether, in a particular situation, its procompet-
itive benefits outweigh its anticompetitive deficits.
As Judges Cote and Livingston saw it, Apple’s conduct had no 
social benefits, and a balancing of harms would have been beside 
the point. How did they reach that conclusion in light of the social 
benefits flowing from destroying Amazon’s chokehold over 
ebooks? The answer, of course, is that they believed it was proper 
to consider only the single social benefit of consumer welfare, 
which to them meant prices, industry output, and little else. They 
were not alone in this view. Regrettably, for these purposes as well 
as for others, courts generally ignore everything other than price 
and output.304
Judge Livingston’s analysis also suffered from an unwarranted 
factual assumption. “[A]mazon was taking a risk by engaging in 
loss-leader pricing, losing money on some sales in order to encour-
age readers to adopt the Kindle,” she wrote.305 Judge Livingston did 
the Choice-of-Evils Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1859, 1872–73 (2003) (regarding criminal law);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 263 cmt. d, § 288A(e) (AM. LAW INST. 1975) (regarding 
torts).
301. Richard S. Wirtz, Purpose and Effect in Sherman Act Conspiracies, 57 WASH. L. REV. 1, 12
(1981). Wirtz argues: “The question is whether in a given case there is a reasonable likeli-
hood that [conduct that stifles competition in some fashion] will do equivalent good.” Id.
302. See, e.g., id. at 39.
303. 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
304. Cf. John B. Kirkwood, Collusion to Control a Powerful Customer: Amazon, E-Books, and 
Antitrust Policy, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 20 (2014) (stating that contemporary antitrust “deci-
sions have rejected attempts to justify collusion on the ground that it would promote social 
values, like public safety, or put an end to illegal behavior.”).
305. United States v. Apple Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 332 (2d Cir. 2015). Judge Livingston also 
observed that “the district court did not find that Amazon used the $9.99 price point to 
‘assure[] its domination’ in the ebook market, or that its pricing strategy acted as a ‘barrier 
to entry’ for other retailers.” Id. at 299 (emphasis in original). That was literally true but mis-
leading because it erroneously implied that the district court found that Amazon had not 
engaged in predatory pricing. Judge Livingston also suggested that Amazon’s $9.99 price 
point caused it to lose only a small amount of money on only a small percentage of its total 
sales, which it used as loss leader to encourage customers to purchase the Kindle. Id. at 327. 
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not cite a factual finding by the district court for that proposition. 
In fact, the district court never made such a finding. Judge Cote 
had found that Amazon was selling many books “as loss leaders at 
$9.99.”306 That may have implied that Amazon made up those losses 
elsewhere—on its Kindle or on ebooks—but it was nothing more 
than an unsupported implication. In fact, Judge Cote had expressly 
chosen not to consider whether Amazon had engaged in legitimate 
loss leading or predatory pricing.307
The courts should have determined whether Amazon’s $9.99 
price point constituted predatory pricing.308 That should have been 
an integral part of their rule of reason analysis. After all, Apple’s
conduct would have an important procompetitive effect if it elimi-
nated an unlawful predatory pricing scheme. Moreover, the De-
partment of Justice should have considered whether Amazon was 
engaging in predatory pricing before bringing its action against 
Apple and the publishers in the first place. As DOJ saw it, Apple 
and the publishers engaged in conduct that violated the antitrust 
laws. However, even assuming that DOJ was correct, should DOJ 
have exercised its discretion to intervene in this marketplace battle 
if the purpose and effect of Apple and the publishers’ conduct was 
to extinguish a predatory pricing scheme that Amazon used to pro-
tect a monopoly?
In his dissent, Judge Jacobs said those statements were apparently based on a filing by Ama-
zon that the district court never accepted. Moreover, it ignored the fact that the books that 
Amazon sold for $9.99—bestsellers and new releases—accounted for a disproportionately 
high fraction of its total ebook sales. Id. at 344 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
Judge Livingston may also have been influenced by something else, as well. Based on 
Chicago School doctrine, which held that for the most part predatory pricing schemes 
would be irrational, courts became skeptical about predatory pricing claims in general. The 
Supreme Court famously declared: “[T]here is a consensus among commentators that pred-
atory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.” Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 572, 589 (1986) (citing Chicago School adher-
ents Robert Bork and Frank Easterbrook, among others). This mindset could easily prompt 
one to leap to the conclusion that Amazon must have been engaging in loss leading rather 
than predatory pricing. Chicago School theory notwithstanding, real-world experience 
shows that predatory pricing schemes do exist and are often successful. See Bogus, The New 
Road to Serfdom, supra note 13, at 25; Khan, supra note 121, at 730 (2017) (stating that “a host 
of research shows that predatory pricing can be ‘an attractive anticompetitive strategy’ and 
has been used by dominant forms across sectors to squash and deter competition.”); and 
sources cited in both articles.
306. United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 643, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 791 F.3d 
290 (2d Cir. 2015).
307. Id. at 708.
308. Cf. Kirkwood, supra note 304, at 34 (arguing that “it is likely that Amazon was en-
gaged in loss leading rather than predatory pricing” because, in Kirkwood’s view, Amazon 
was not trying to drive rival ebook retailers out of the market).
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That raises the question of whether Amazon was engaged in loss 
leading.309 Loss leading is using below-cost pricing on one product 
or service as a magnet to draw customers in the hope of making a 
profit from other transactions. Grocery stores, for example, often 
use milk as a loss leader. Consumers are particularly conscious of 
milk prices.310 The stores heavily advertise milk prices, and they 
place milk at the furthest point from the entrance. Their strategy is 
to attract customers to the store to buy milk, entice them to pick 
up other products while they are there, and make a profit on the 
total purchase at checkout. Loss leading is a venerable and often-
accepted practice. Predatory pricing, by contrast, is pricing below 
cost—and absorbing losses—for the purpose of driving rivals out of 
a market or deterring rivals from entering a market.311 It is unlaw-
ful because it is attempting to monopolize a line of commerce.312
The key distinction between loss leading and predatory pricing is 
the seller’s intent. Related to that, of course, is whether the seller 
possessed the market power to sustain below-cost pricing long 
enough to succeed in driving rivals out of the market or persuad-
ing them to abandon plans to enter a market.
There were good reasons to suspect that Amazon engaged in 
predatory pricing. Amazon has long been notorious for both em-
ploying predatory practices and for being willing to sustain losses
for long periods of time in order to build its business.313 In addi-
tion, using ebooks as loss leaders to sell ereaders is, on its face, a 
dubious strategy. Customers who invest in a Kindle plan on pur-
chasing scores—if not hundreds—of ebooks over the life of their 
309. Although scholars have vigorously debated the appropriate accounting method to 
determine whether a seller is selling below cost, they have given remarkably little attention 
to differentiating loss leading from predatory pricing.
310. See What Are Loss Leaders in Grocery Stores?, CULINARYLORE (Aug. 9, 2016) https://
culinarylore.com/food-culture:what-are-loss-leaders-in-grocery-stores; see also Chris Fleisher, 
Loss-leaders: predatory or practical?, AM. ECON. ASS’N (Mar. 24, 2017), https://
www.aeaweb.org/research/loss-leading-bans-retail-competition (noting that loss leading is 
unlawful in some states).
311. HOVENKAMP, supra note 95, at 455; see also Shaun D. Ledgerwood & Wesley J. Heath, 
Rummaging Through the Bottom of Pandora’s Box: Funding Predatory Pricing Through Contempora-
neous Recoupment, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 509, 566 (2012) (discussing when loss leading be-
comes predatory pricing). For another example of loss leading, see supra note 268, which 
describes pricing one of Louise Penny’s mystery books at an extremely low price in the hope 
of creating new Penny fans who will buy more of her fourteen books.
312. HOVENKAMP, supra note 95, at 455–56.
313. See, e.g., Bogus, The New Road to Serfdom, supra note 13, at 25 n.127 (regarding Ama-
zon’s history of predatory pricing); STONE, supra note 122, at 69, 96–97 (regarding Amazon’s
history of sustaining losses for long periods of time).
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devices.314 Could Amazon’s profit margin on the Kindle have been 
fat enough to compensate for a very long chain of small losses? 
When first released in 2007, Amazon sold the Kindle for nearly 
$400.00, but that did not last long. The Kindle sold for $150.00 by 
July 2010 and for less than $100.00 the following year. Market ana-
lysts believed that at least by 2011Amazon was selling the Kindle, as 
well as ebooks, below cost.315 It appears that the old joke applies: 
Amazon was selling everything below cost but making it up on vol-
ume.316
2. The Dissent
“I have no quarrel with the district court’s conscientious findings 
of fact; I affirmatively rely on them and cite them throughout,”
wrote Judge Dennis Jacobs as he began his dissent.317 As he saw it, 
however, the district court failed to understand the significance of 
those facts or properly relate them to the applicable legal stand-
ards.
Judge Jacobs argued that the district court made three funda-
mental errors. First, the district court erred in finding that Apple’s
conduct constituted a per se violation of the antitrust laws. “A verti-
cal arrangement that facilitates a horizontal price fixing conspiracy 
does not amount to a per se violation,” he wrote. Second, Judge Ja-
cobs believed that “the district court assessed impacts on competi-
tion without recognizing that Apple’s role as a vertical player dif-
ferentiated it from the publishers.”318 Apple was a direct rival of 
Amazon; both were ebook retailers (as was Barnes & Noble). All 
the talk of conspiracy and collusion was misplaced. This was not a 
situation where, for example, competitors colluded against their 
customers. “All Apple’s energy—and all it did that has been con-
demned in this case—was directed to weakening its competitive ri-
val, and pushing it aside to make room for Apple’s entry,” Judge 
314. I suspect my own experience is typical. The Nook books I tend to purchase are new 
releases, the very category Amazon sold below cost. If a paperback edition is available, I gen-
erally prefer that format to the ebook edition.
315. See Khan, supra note 121, at 757 (stating that analysts estimated that Amazon was 
selling the Kindle below its manufacturing cost).
316. Cf. Richard J. Gilbert, E-books: A Tale of Digital Disruption, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 165, 172 
(2015) (stating that the evidence is consistent with Amazon’s strategy to use its entire book 
business, including both physical and ebooks, as loss leaders to draw customers to its website 
in order to sell them “the plethora of other items that Amazon sells.”).
317. United States v. Apple Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 340 (2d Cir. 2015) (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
318. Id. at 341.
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Jacobs wrote.319 Apple did, of course, enter into vertical arrange-
ments with publishers, but such arrangements are customary and 
necessary and “do not represent the same presumptive threat to 
competition.”320 Moreover, every term that Apple included in its 
contracts with publishers—the agency model, the MFN clause, and 
price caps—were lawful.321 Third and most importantly, Apple in-
creased competition. It entered a market dominated by a firm with 
a ninety percent market share. How could the district court have 
thought that ending a monopoly was somehow anticompetitive? It 
reached that result by mistakenly assuming that Amazon’s $9.99 
price was good for consumers because it was so low—lower even 
than cost—and prices rose after the switch to the agency model.322
However, the goal of antitrust is competition, not low prices. “[I]t 
can be safely assumed that if competition sharpens, prices will take 
care of themselves,” Judge Jacobs noted.323 When properly assessed 
under the rule of reason, it became clear that Apple’s conduct “was 
unambiguously and overwhelmingly pro-competitive.”324
Judge Jacobs relied heavily on Leegin,325 in which the Supreme 
Court reversed a century of precedent regarding resale price 
maintenance. Prior to Leegin, a manufacturer could set and require 
retailers to adhere to a retail price if it acted entirely unilaterally. 
If, however, the manufacturer’s policy resulted from an agreement 
with distributors or retailers, the agreement was deemed a per se vi-
olation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. In Leegin, the Supreme 
Court recognized that there were procompetitive justifications for 
resale price maintenance. Leegin designed and manufactured 
leather belts and other women’s fashion accessories. It sold its 
products under the brand name “Brighton,” and it sought to cre-
ate a certain image and reputation for that brand. In furtherance 
of that strategy, Leegin sold its products through boutiques and 
specialty stores that provided customers with better service and 
more attractive settings than they would receive in large, imper-
sonal stores. Those stores had higher overheads than large stores. 
Leegin, therefore, set suggested retail prices that would provide re-
tailers with a generous margin and adopted a policy of not selling 
319. Id. at 347–48.
320. Id. at 348.
321. Id. at 350.
322. Id. at 343–44.
323. Id. at 350.
324. Id. at 341.
325. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
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to retailers that sold Brighton products below Leegin’s suggested 
retail price.
Leegin cut off a retailer for discounting Brighton goods, and the 
retailer sued. If plaintiff could show that Leegin’s resale price 
maintenance policy resulted from agreements with or at the re-
quest by other retailers, Leegin’s conduct would have constituted a 
per se violation under prior doctrine. In Leegin, the Supreme Court 
overturned that rule. The Court began by noting that the per se
rule is appropriate for restraints that have manifestly anticompeti-
tive effects and lack any redeeming virtues.326 Courts originally 
thought that resale price maintenance benefitted only distributors 
by eliminating price competition among them. But modern eco-
nomics recognized that such policies can benefit manufacturers 
and promote inter-brand competition. Resale price maintenance 
helped to “give consumers more options so that they can choose 
among low-price, low-service brands; high-price, high-service 
brands; and brands that fall in between,” the Court explained in 
Leegin.327
Leegin rounded out a series of cases that draw sharp distinctions 
between horizontally imposed and vertically imposed restraints. 
Taken together, the cases hold that courts must evaluate all vertical 
restraints under the rule of reason. The Court had previously held 
that courts should not apply the per se rule to vertical nonprice re-
straints328 or to vertical arrangements that set maximum prices.329 In
Leegin, the Court made clear that courts must evaluate all vertical 
price restraints under the rule of reason, including specifically 
those fixing minimum prices.330 “Our recent cases formulate anti-
trust principles in accordance with the appreciated differences in 
economic effect between vertical and horizontal agreements,” the 
Court explained.331 The Court noted that most vertical restraints 
promote interbrand competition, and that interbrand competition 
is more important than intrabrand competition because it facili-
tates market entry for new firms and new products, promotes inno-
vation, provides consumers with a greater diversity of products, and 
326. Id. at 886.
327. Id. at 890.
328. See id. at 901 (citing Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 
(1977)).
329. See id. at 902 (citing State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997)).
330. See id. at 907 (declaring that “[v]ertical price restraints are to be judged by the rule 
of reason.”).
331. Id. at 888.
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promotes a dynamic economy.332 Thus, courts must evaluate any 
restraints imposed vertically by Apple under the rule of reason. 
It is necessary, therefore, to decide whether the contract terms 
at issue in United States v. Apple—the agency model, price caps, and 
an MFN clause—should be classified as vertical or horizontal re-
straints. They would be vertical restraints if Apple included them in 
its contracts with the publishers on its own initiative and for its own 
interests. To track language from a seminal Supreme Court case, 
the courts should have asked themselves: Did Apple “rely on indi-
vidual self-interest to bring about general voluntary acquiescence”
by the publishers?333 Conversely, did each publisher make an “indi-
vidual free choice prompted alone by the desirability” of the Apple 
contract?334 If the answers to those questions are yes, then the con-
tractual devices are vertical. On the other hand, if Apple pressured 
the publishers into “substantial unanimity” and deliberately in-
duced them to take “concerted action” to switch Amazon to the 
agency model, it became “the organizer of a [horizontal price-
fixing] combination or conspiracy” among the publishers.335 Decid-
ing which scenario occurred required the courts to make a judg-
ment not only about what Apple and publishers did, but on the 
subjective motivations for their actions. That is a difficult and un-
certain endeavor. It is, therefore, not surprising that the judges di-
vided on the vertical versus horizontal question. As Judges Cote, 
Livingston, and Lohier saw it, the publishers engaged in horizontal 
price-fixing conspiracy, which Apple either joined or instigated. 
Judge Jacobs did not challenge the district court’s finding that the 
publishers had engaged in a horizontal conspiracy, but he believed 
that even if that were the case, Apple’s relevant conduct was verti-
cal. “On the only horizontal plane that matters to Apple’s ebook 
business, Apple was in competition and never in collusion,” he 
wrote.336
How sensible is this inquiry? Briefly reconsider the key facts:
Even before Apple showed up, the publishers were talking among 
332. See id. at 890, 895 (stating that the laws are designed primarily to protect interbrand 
competition); id. 889–92 (describing the benefits of inter-brand competition); cf.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 95, at 651 (expressing skepticism about balancing intrabrand and 
inter-brand competition).
333. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 46–47 (1960) (suggesting that 
pursuit of individual self-interest by a manufacturer legitimizes retail price maintenance).
334. Id.
335. Id. at 47.
336. United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 791 F.3d 290 
(2d Cir. 2015).
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themselves about the danger that Amazon’s $9.99 price point 
posed for their industry. They feared that selling ebooks below cost 
devalued their product—books, in all formats—in the public’s
mind, and, thus, they wanted ebook retail prices for new releases 
and bestsellers to rise. In one fashion or another, they communi-
cated all of that to Apple. A couple of publishers discussed between 
themselves whether the agency model would be desirable, and 
perhaps whether they ought to suggest it to Apple. Later they did, 
in fact, suggest the agency model to Apple. Did those publishers 
agree that they would both urge Apple to adopt the agency model? 
Or after jointly brainstorming the question did each publisher in-
dividually decide to suggest the agency model to Apple? My guess 
is that if we asked the publishers which scenario occurred, they 
themselves honestly might not know the answer.
Meanwhile, from Apple’s perspective, the publishers’ desires 
were fortuitous. Apple wanted to enter the ebook retailing business 
provided it could make a profit. It could not do so under the 
wholesale model as long as Amazon sold ebooks below cost. After 
talking with the publishers, Apple realized that their interests were 
compatible with its own. It devised a contract that gave the pub-
lishers control over the retail price of their ebooks—which it knew 
was something the publishers wanted—but Apple limited their 
control with price caps. Apple included an MFN clause, which gave 
publishers an incentive to switch Amazon to the agency model and 
protected Apple in the event they did not do so. Apple told the 
publishers it was offering all of them the same basic contract, and 
there would have been nothing wrong with their confirming that 
with each other. The publishers believed they could not take on 
Amazon individually, and Apple knew that was what the publishers 
believed. Ultimately, five of the Big Six demanded that Amazon 
shift to the agency model.
The key legal question is whether the publishers acted collective-
ly or in unison. Collective action is the product of agreement. 
While agreements can be made expressly or impliedly, collective 
action requires active agreement by some method. Acting in
unison, in contrast, means taking the same action simultaneously 
without agreement. A school of fish changes direction because the 
fish act in unison. Each fish independently changes direction be-
cause it senses what the other fish are doing, and it feels safest stay-
ing in the school. There is no “unity of purpose,” “common design 
and understanding,” or “meeting of minds” among the fish, which 
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are the hallmarks of collective action under antitrust law.337 It is en-
tirely possible the publishers acted in unison rather than collective-
ly. Each publisher knew that the Apple contract gave the other 
publishers strong incentives to switch Amazon to the agency mod-
el. Each publisher was able to predict that many, if not all, of the 
other publishers would move to switch Amazon to the agency 
model.338 Moreover, each publisher knew that its acting to switch 
Amazon to an agency contract would increase the chances of other 
publishers following suit. That is quite different from agreeing to 
act in concert with other publishers.
* * *
Regulators and the courts could have, and should have, reached 
the opposite result under existing doctrine. The Department of 
Justice should not have brought this lawsuit in the first place.
When it did, the courts should have decided the case in Apple’s fa-
vor. There are at least three reasons why the courts should have 
reached a different result. First, Judge Cote should not have con-
cluded that the publishers conspired to fix prices. This shall be ex-
plained further in the next Section of this Article. Second, regula-
tors and courts should have evaluated the contract terms at issue—
price caps and the MFN clause—under the rule of reason and con-
cluded that they were justified by procompetitive effects. Third, as 
part of their rule of reason analysis, regulators and courts should 
also have excused any technical violation under lesser-evil or ne-
cessity-type theories.
Although it has been necessary to discuss the courts’ analyses, 
the primary objective of this Article is not to demonstrate how the 
case could have come out differently by applying this or that rule 
differently. Rather, it to show why the regulators and judges 
reached such a wrongheaded result. What misled them was not 
discrete rules of antitrust law but the big things—the basic assump-
tions and overarching worldview into which they had been accul-
turated and took for granted. It was as if they tried to make their 
337. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984) (quoting 
American Tobacco v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946)).
338. There was evidence to support this interpretation of events. E.g., Trial Transcript, 
United States v. Apple Inc., supra note 109, at 469–70 (testimony from Carolyn Kroll Reidy,
who stated that, based not on private conversations but on public comments reported in 
newspapers, she felt “fairly confident” that if her firm changed its business model with Ama-
zon, Hachette and HarperCollins would follow suit); id. at 612–14 (describing how, based 
on knowing her counterparts so well, together with tidbits of information she was able to 
pick up, she was able to predict what other publishers were likely to do).
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way through a legal thicket with a map that was more or less accu-
rate, but they kept misreading the map because their compass con-
stantly pointed in a wildly wrong direction. They were fixated on 
lower prices when they should have been worrying about consoli-
dated corporate power.
III. WHY ANTITRUST MUST DEAL WITH 
CONSOLIDATED CORPORATE POWER
This should have been a simple case. With a ninety percent 
market share, Amazon enjoyed a de facto monopoly in ebook re-
tailing.339 As the court of appeals itself noted, a market share ex-
ceeding eighty percent is deemed to constitute a monopoly under 
antitrust law.340 Although Barnes & Noble had just entered the 
market, Amazon enjoyed significant advantages over its single ma-
jor competitor.341 One advantage was Amazon’s relative financial 
strength. As the 372nd largest corporation in America, Barnes & 
Noble was no bit player; nevertheless, Amazon, which ranked
100th on the Fortune 500, dwarfed its competitor.342 In addition, 
Amazon was willing to use financial strength to protect its monopo-
ly with predatory pricing. Its pricing scheme not only deterred pu-
tative competitors from entering the market but also drained re-
sources from Barnes & Noble. In a marathon price war between 
these two firms, Amazon would likely win, notwithstanding critics 
rating the Nook as the superior ereader. 
Even more importantly, there was a real risk of Amazon parlay-
ing its monopoly in ebook retailing into a monopoly in all book re-
tailing.343 In 2010, no one knew whether ebooks would replace 
physical books. Some knowledgeable observers thought they 
339. With the exception of legally sanctioned monopolies such as public utilities and 
patented products, there are few absolute monopolies. It is generally accepted that firms 
with a sixty-five or seventy percent market share may possess monopoly power—that is, the 
ability to reduce total industry output and increase prices—and firms with a ninety percent 
market share do possess market power. See Steven F. Ross, Principles of Antitrust 38–39 (1993)
(citing the seventy and ninety percent thresholds); GELLHORN ET AL., supra note 142, at 118 
(citing sixty-five percent as the “minimum monopolization threshold . . . .”). Market share 
alone may be a misleading indicator of monopoly power where there is high product differ-
entiation or easy entry into the market. Id. at 115–16. Neither of those situations are present 
here.
340. Apple Inc., 791 F.3d at 342.
341. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 650.
342. Fortune 500 2010, supra note 154.
343. See supra notes 128–35 and accompanying text.
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would, and the shift would come quickly.344 That is why Barnes & 
Noble had no choice but to enter the ebook market, even though 
it had to compete with a financially stronger company selling 
ebooks below cost. It was damned if it did and damned if it didn’t; 
what else could it do but take the plunge and try to swim in rough 
water? A potential Amazon monopoly in book retailing had conse-
quences not just for Barnes & Noble and independent booksellers 
but for the nation. Books are of profound importance to American 
culture and its political discourse. Having a single firm decide 
which books are sold in America, and how books offered for sale 
are displayed—which are conspicuously promoted, which are hard 
to find—would be an Orwellian nightmare. 
Apple’s entry into the market accomplished two things: It added 
a financially capable and technologically sophisticated competitor 
to the market, and it knocked down the barriers to entry protect-
ing Amazon’s de facto monopoly. In view of these simple realities, 
Apple should have been welcomed as a rescuer on a white horse. 
Instead, antitrust regulators and the courts viewed Apple as a vil-
lain. Why?
Let’s start with Judge Cote’s most critical finding of fact. “[T]his 
Court has found,” she wrote, “that Apple knowingly and intention-
ally participated in and facilitated a horizontal conspiracy to elimi-
nate retail price competition and raise the retail prices of 
ebooks.”345 But, there was no direct evidence to support that find-
ing.346 Eddy Cue, Apple’s chief negotiator, and CEOs of the pub-
lishing companies all denied that they had conspired to fix prices. 
That, of course, did not settle things. It is not unheard of for par-
ticipants in unlawful enterprises to deny wrongdoing. This, howev-
er, was far from the typical case. The publishers freely admitted 
they wanted to raise ebook prices.347 This case is also unusual in 
344. See supra notes 133–36 and accompanying text.
345. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 697.
346. Judge Cote claimed that her finding was supported by both direct and circumstan-
tial evidence. Id. However, I would characterize all the evidence she cited as circumstantial. 
Direct evidence does not require the fact finder to make an inference or deduction to reach 
the desired conclusion while circumstantial evidence requires reasoning in order to reach 
the desired conclusion. Someone who testifies that he saw the defendant shoot the victim 
has given direct evidence. Someone who testifies that he heard a gunshot sound and then 
immediately saw the defendant, holding a smoking gun, run from a room in which only the 
defendant and victim had been present, has given circumstantial evidence. Neither form of 
proof is inherently superior to the other. See, e.g., KENNETH S. BROUN (ed.), MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE 308 (6th ed. 2006); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE
155–56 (4th ed. 2009).
347. See, e.g., Trial Transcript, United States v. Apple Inc., supra note 109, at 484 (testi-
mony from Carolyn Kroll Reidy).
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that the publishers did not want to raise prices to increase their 
profits. They made less money selling under the agency model with 
price caps than they had previously under the wholesale model 
with Amazon. Moreover, price caps are, at least on the surface, not 
fixed prices. So how did the Judge Cote find that the publishers 
and Apple conspired to fix prices?
She based her determination largely on the following evidence. 
After Apple opened its iBookstore, the five defendant publishers 
priced nearly all ebooks at or very close to the price caps.348 Judge 
Cote noted that not only did the publishers increase their ebook 
prices, but they also increased prices for hardback editions of some 
new releases. Because ebook price caps were related to hardback 
list prices, Judge Cote believed the publishers increased hardback 
prices in those circumstances “in order to move the e-book version 
into a correspondingly higher price tier.”349 The price increases 
were “sudden and immediate” for all five of the publishers that 
signed agency agreements with Apple.350 Meanwhile, the average 
ebook prices for Random House, the one major publisher that did 
not sign Apple’s contract, remained unchanged.351 Judge Cote also 
noted that, in their negotiations with Apple the publishers “fought 
hardest over the price caps.”352 From this evidence, Judge Cote rea-
soned that, when they negotiated the contracts, the publishers and 
Apple intended the price caps to be the actual, fixed prices for 
ebooks. Calling them “caps” was camouflage.
Despite its surface appeal, Judge Cote’s conclusion falls far short 
of the preponderance of the evidence standard. That is, it is not 
reasonable to conclude from the evidence that it is more likely 
than not that Apple and the publishers agreed, either expressly or 
tacitly, that the price caps were to be the actual prices of ebooks. 
There are at least two other explanations as to why all five publish-
ers raised their ebook prices to the level of the price caps while 
Random House did not.
The first possibility is that the caps were too low, meaning, lower 
than ebook prices would be in a competitive market with no 
348. Judge Cote wrote: “In the five months [following Apple opening its iBookstore], the 
Publisher Defendants collectively priced 85.7% of their New Release titles sold through Am-
azon and 92.1% of their New Release titles sold through Apple within 1.00% of the price 
caps. This was also true for 99.4% of the NYT Bestseller titles on Apple’s iBookstore, and 
96.8% of NYT Bestsellers sold through Amazon.” Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. at 682.
349. Id. at 683.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 682–83.
352. Id. at 667.
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agreement on pricing. Bear in mind that the $9.99 pricing was too 
low. It was below the wholesale price of ebooks and, if ebooks were 
to carry their fair share of costs, below production costs. Apple was 
willing to allow the publishers to set the retail prices of their 
books—but only up to a point. It wanted to limit how far prices 
could rise. Price caps are synthetic: They do not allow prices to be 
entirely determined by the free market. If the caps were, in fact, 
too low or, at least, the publishers perceived them as being too low, 
it is entirely understandable that they would be the subject of in-
tense negotiations. Apple had an interest in controlling ebooks 
costs—a quite particular interest because, unlike Amazon and 
Barnes & Noble, it sold only ebooks and not physical books. The 
publishers’ interest was to have as much freedom as possible in set-
ting retail prices for their ebooks—ideally, complete, unrestricted 
freedom. The evidence was that Apple wanted the price caps and 
imposed them against the wishes of the publishers.353 All of this ex-
plains why the parties vigorously negotiated the caps, and why all 
of the publishers raised their ebook prices to the caps as soon as 
they could. Meanwhile, there was no corresponding change in 
Random House ebook pricing at Amazon (which is what the court 
measured) because Random House had not changed its arrange-
ment with Amazon. Moreover, Amazon was rewarding Random 
House by giving its books special prominence on its website. Ran-
dom House was, therefore, hardly the valid “control group.”354
There is another possible explanation for the five publishers’
decision to all raise their prices to the caps. When a limit is estab-
lished, common forces often propel independent actors to cluster 
near the limit. At my law school, for example, instructors must dis-
tribute grades in required courses so that the mean grade falls 
within a prescribed range. As it turns out, most instructors award 
grades just below the upper limit of the range. That does not hap-
pen because the faculty members agreed to grade near the limit; 
nor did the faculty intend that outcome when it established the 
curve. I suspect that faculty tend to grade at or near the top of the 
grade curve because they feel generous towards their students, 
want to be liked by their students, want students to register for 
353. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
354. An expert witness for the government testified that the publisher defendants’
ebook sales declined by 14.5% relative to the control group, Random House. Apple argued 
that this was due to Amazon aggressively promoting Random House on its website. Judge 
Cote found this unpersuasive but did not explain why other than saying Apple had failed to 
persuade her. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 684, 684 n.56.
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their elective courses, or some combination thereof. At the risk of 
dating myself, let me offer a second example. When I was a college 
freshman, there was a 2:00 AM weekend curfew for women stu-
dents. A very high portion of dates ended just before curfew. That 
certainly did not result from any agreement. It happened because 
ending a date earlier was tantamount to announcing to each other 
and all friends that the date had been a failure. When women’s
curfews were abandoned a year or two later there was, immediately, 
no longer any particularly popular time for ending dates.
Just suggesting a price—whether in the form of a cap or other-
wise—will almost certainly affect pricing. This is because of a phe-
nomenon that psychologists call the anchoring effect. Anchoring is 
a heuristic or cognitive shortcut “in which decisions are made 
based on an initial ‘anchor.’”355 The first experiments involved sug-
gesting a particular value before asking subjects to guess, estimate, 
or predict a value. Daniel Kahneman gives the following example: 
“If you consider how much you should pay for a house, you will be 
influenced by the asking price. The same house will appear more 
valuable if its listing price is high than if it is low, even if you are 
determined to resist the influence of this number.”356 Retailers spe-
cializing in expensive designer goods often employ the anchoring 
heuristic as a sales device. A Prada T-shirt may be priced at 
$500.00, for example, not as much to sell that T-shirt but to sell 
another one priced at $275.00.357
Research on the anchoring effect has upset long-held beliefs. It 
used to be conventional wisdom that a negotiator should let the 
other side make the first offer. Behavioral economists now tell us 
that the party making the first offer generally has an advantage be-
cause it gets the benefit of the anchoring effect.358 Anchoring af-
fects everyone, even professionals making judgments in their areas 
of expertise.359 It works for at least two reasons. One is the subtle 
power of suggestion.360 The other is that an anchor prompts people 
355. Anchoring (and Adjustment), BEHAVIOURALFINANCE.NET, http://
heuristics.behaviouralfinance.net/anchoring (last visited Oct. 28, 2018); see also DANIEL 
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 117–28, 427–30 (2013).
356. KAHNEMAN, supra note 355, at 120.
357. Blair Enns, Always Be Anchoring, WIN WITHOUT PITCHING, https://
www.winwithoutpitching.com/always-be-anchoring (April 1, 2015).
358. Id.; see also KAHNEMAN, supra note 355, at 126–27; Jenny Roberts & Ronald F. 
Wright, Training for Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1445, 1483–87 (2016).
359. KAHNEMAN, supra note 355, at 124–27.
360. Psychologists call this a priming effect. Id. at 130–31. Regarding the power of sug-
gestion, see generally Robert B. Michael et al., Suggestion, Cognition, and Behavior, 21 
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 151 (2012).
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to start their process of evaluation at the anchor and then assess 
whether that is too high or too low.361 Regardless of whether the 
decision-making process is fully conscious, publishing executives 
will decide to price the ebook edition of a particular title at the cap 
unless they convince themselves there is a good reason not to do 
so. What would convince them otherwise? Bear in mind that their 
goal is not to maximize the sales of the ebook edition but to max-
imize total sales of all editions of a book. Pricing the ebook edition 
of a new release or bestseller too low would be unwise. The pub-
lishers do not want to skew consumer choices away from the hard-
back and toward the ebook edition, especially if they would make a
smaller net profit on the ebook.
The evidence, therefore, does not warrant concluding that be-
cause the five publishers priced most of their ebooks at or very 
close to the caps they must have conspired to do so. Why did Judge 
Cote reach that conclusion? Her evaluation of witness credibility 
was not a deciding factor.362 Even before she heard any of the wit-
nesses testify before her, Judge Cote informed counsel that her 
“tentative view” was that Apple “knowingly participated in and facil-
itated a conspiracy to raise prices of e-books.”363 Nor did Judge 
Cote go astray because of any lack of skill, experience, or diligence. 
She is a highly regarded jurist.364 And, of course, Judge Cote was 
hardly alone in going astray. Lawyers in the Antitrust Division of 
the U.S. Department of Justice and two of the three judges on the 
Second Circuit panel saw the case the same way she did. How 
could they all have been so wrong?
The answer is that they were steeped in Chicago School doc-
trine. As elaborated in more detail elsewhere, nearly everyone ac-
cepts the Chicago School worldview in antitrust law.365 Although 
there are a few dissenters, the Chicago School is the consensus vi-
sion. It has so saturated antitrust law that many judges and lawyers 
361. KAHNEMAN, supra note 355, at 122–23.
362. Regarding Judge Cote’s evaluation of witness credibility, see supra note 240 and ac-
companying text.
363. See David Margolick, The Judge that Apple Hates, VANITY FAIR (June 2014), https://
www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2014/06/judge-denise-cote-apple-sanctions-e-book-
price-fixing.
364. Lawyers consider her exceptionally smart, knowledgeable, diligent, and fair. I base 
this both on the opinions of lawyers I know who have appeared before her and lawyer com-
ments in the Almanac of the Federal Judiciary. See Denise L. Cote, 2 ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY, 2018 WL 3220091 (2018).
365. See Bogus, The New Road to Serfdom, supra note 13, at 15–26 (describing Chicago 
School doctrine), 26–37 (regarding the enormous influence of the Chicago School in anti-
trust doctrine).
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have absorbed the basic doctrine without necessarily realizing that 
they are seeing antitrust through a very particular lens. In fact, the 
more knowledgeable a judge or lawyer is about antitrust law, the 
more likely he or she is to take the Chicago School worldview for 
granted. 
What we call today the Chicago School of law-and-economics 
originated with an economist named Aaron Director, who, alt-
hough he had no legal training, was appointed to the faculty of the 
University of Chicago Law School in 1946.366 That appointment 
had been arranged by several people, including the famed Austri-
an economist Friedrich A. Hayek, who wanted to create an institute 
devoted to promoting libertarian visions of free market capitalism 
and to house it—not within the economics department, as might 
have been expected—within the law school.367 The Volker Fund fi-
nanced the project, and Director, who was personally close to Hay-
ek and also happened to be Milton Friedman’s brother-in-law, was 
selected to head the institute.
Director co-taught antitrust law, which was then a required 
course at the law school. Director was charismatic, and on the days 
he commanded the classroom, he argued that the traditional anti-
trust doctrine that his co-instructor had described in prior sessions 
was nonsense in terms of economic analysis.368 One of Director’s
students, Robert Bork, described the experience as undergoing 
“what can only be called a religious conversion. It changed our 
view of the entire world.”369 Many of Director’s other students and 
faculty colleagues also became devoted followers, including Rich-
ard Posner, Frank Easterbrook, and Douglas Ginsburg. Director 
also established the Journal of Law & Economics, which helped at-
tract the future Nobel Laureate Ronald H. Coase to Chicago. 
“When I came to the University of Chicago, I regarded my role as
that of Saint Paul to Aaron Director’s Christ,” said Coase.370
While Director never wrote much himself, his disciples did. Pos-
ner wrote many influential articles promoting the law-and-
economics gospel, as well as the textbook Economic Analysis of the 
366. Aaron Director, Founder of the Field of Law and Economics, U. CHI. NEWS OFFICE (Sept. 
13, 2004), http://www-news.uchicago.edu/releases/04/040913.director.shtml.
367. STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE 
FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 91–95 (2008)
368. Director’s co-instructor was Edward Levi, who, during the course of his career, be-
came dean of the Law School, president of the University, and Attorney General of the 
United States. Id. at 94.
369. TELES, supra note 367, at 94.
370. Id. at 96.
WINTER 2019] Books and Olive Oil 335
Law.371 Bork wrote The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself.372
It is almost impossible to overstate the impact of Bork’s book on 
antitrust law. For forty years, it has been read by everyone who spe-
cializes in antitrust law. It has been cited in thousands of law review 
articles and in hundreds of decisions by courts and administrative 
agencies, including eighteen United States Supreme Court deci-
sions.373 No book in the history of American jurisprudence may 
have had a greater effect on a field of law than has Bork’s. 
At the time of his brother-in-law’s death, Milton Friedman said 
that Director’s great achievement had been “to apply economic 
analysis to the kind of issues that had been treated on the basis of 
supposed common sense before.”374 Friedman’s statement suggests 
that Director and his disciples were merely using objective eco-
nomic principles to inform legal doctrine—and therein lies the 
power of law-and-economics. Its adherents characterize it as neu-
tral and quasi-scientific, and many have accepted it as such. In real-
ity, however, Chicago School law-and-economics is an ideological 
movement with a libertarian worldview.375 Its success can hardly be 
overstated. As Steven M. Teles has written, “[s]imply measured in 
terms of the penetration of its adherents in the legal academy, law
and economics is the most successful intellectual movement in the 
law in the past thirty years, having rapidly moved from insurgency 
to hegemony.”376
A full explanation of the Chicago School doctrine is both be-
yond the scope of this Article and unnecessary for its purposes. 
This Article does not argue that the government regulators and 
judges who handled the Apple Inc. case were dedicated members of 
371. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW (4th ed. 1992) (1973).
372. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (rev. ed. 
1993) (1978).
373. WESTLAW, https://1.next.westlaw.com (search “‘Bork’ /2 ‘Antitrust Paradox’”)
(yielding 188 cases, 2645 secondary sources, and 3375 total results in search run on Novem-
ber 6, 2018).
374. Douglas Martin, Aaron Director, Economist, Dies at 102, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2004), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/16/us/aaron-director-economist-dies-at-102.html.
375. See, e.g., Thomas M. Melsheimera, Economics and Ideology: Antitrust in the 1980s, 42 
STAN. L. REV. 1319, 1321 (1990) (stating “[t]he Chicago School of antitrust uses economic 
principles to buttress an ideology about antitrust that, in its most basic terms, is hostile to 
the idea of interference with the operation of the free market.”); see also Bogus, The New 
Road to Serfdom, supra note 13, at 15–37; cf. Spencer Weber Waller, The Law and Economics 
Virus, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 367, 367, 387 (2009) (stating that law-and-economics is “a leading 
example of a highly successful legal ideology,” and that libertarians subscribe to a particular-
ly strong form of Chicago School ideology); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 232 
(1993) (advocating a similar view).
376. TELES, supra note 367, at 216. Teles describes how law-and-economics moved from a 
fringe “off the wall” movement to the mainstream of the legal academy. Id. at 216–19.
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the Chicago School or knowledgeable about the intricacies of its 
philosophy. Yet, it is likely they had absorbed its basic premises, 
even without recognizing that they were applying doctrinal princi-
ples of the law-and-economics movement rather than uncontrover-
sial principles of the disciplines of law and economics. These prem-
ises have become so widely accepted among judges and lawyers 
who specialize in antitrust that even Apple’s lawyers did not ques-
tion them or suggest that the ebooks litigation ought to be viewed 
through a different lens.377
I believe that government regulators and the courts were led 
astray by the interplay among four of the Chicago School’s most 
basic premises, namely: (1) human beings and business organiza-
tions as rational maximizers;378 (2) as rational maximizers, they 
make decisions “in accord with the tenets of simple pricing theo-
ry;”379 (3) sound antitrust rules can all be logically deduced from 
the first two principles, and so can the motivations and likely con-
duct of business organizations;380 and (4) antitrust should be exclu-
sively about consumer welfare, which is defined as consumer prices 
and total industry output. 
When one looks at the behavior of the publishers in this case 
through the Chicago School lens, one sees publishers who wanted 
to raise ebook prices to increase their profits. That, quite simply, is 
what rational maximizers do. To raise prices, it is necessary to de-
press total industry output. That is what the law of supply and de-
mand requires. As the regulators and judges saw it, the market was 
ebooks, and that meant the publishers’ goal was to raise the prices 
of ebooks and reduce the total industry output of ebooks.
The regulators and judges went in search of evidence to confirm 
what they were convinced must have happened—that is, that 
ebooks prices went up and total industry production of ebooks 
went down—and, not surprisingly, they found it, even if they had 
377. This may have been because Apple’s lawyers themselves accepted law-and-
economics doctrine as neutral principles of law and economics or because they believed it 
tactically unwise to attempt to question such widely accepted premises.
378. Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 
928, 932 (1979); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 5 (1992) (stating 
that the “task of economics . . . is to explore the implications of assuming that man is a ra-
tional maximizer of his ends in life, his satisfactions—what we shall call his ‘self-interest.’”).
Posner is a leading advocate of the Chicago School. See also Bogus, The New Road to Serfdom,
supra note 13, at 21–26 (criticizing the rational maximizer assumption).
379. POSNER, supra note 378, at 928.
380. Id. Although Posner only says explicitly that antitrust policy is deducible from the 
rational maximizer premise, the thrust of his comments suggest that business conduct is also 
deducible from that premise.
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to trip over themselves to do so. In its complaint, the government 
alleged that “the e-book market has exploded, registering triple-
digit sales growth each year” since 2007.381 That was a faux pas. Ap-
ple was quick to pounce. “As a result [of the new state of affairs in 
ebooks]—as even the Government is compelled to admit—output 
has exploded,” it noted its answer.382 The parties considered this 
important because what matters most under Chicago School anti-
trust theory is total industry output: what increases total industry 
output is good; what decreases it is bad.383 Antitrust law is also con-
cerned with consumer prices, but because prices and output are 
deemed to be inversely related by an ironclad law—when prices 
rise, demand falls, and vice versa—it is, grand theory aside, not im-
portant which one is more important than the other. The govern-
ment realized its error and changed its tune. By trial, it argued that 
total production—that is, ebook sales—fell after the shift to the 
agency model caused prices to rise.384 Apple continued to argue 
that ebook sales increased.385 Moreover, according to figures from 
impartial industry sources, ebook sales dramatically increased in 
2010, even at Amazon.386 Because the popularity of ebooks in-
creased and more people acquired ereaders, it was entirely possi-
ble that ebook prices and the total number of ebooks sold both in-
creased. Nevertheless, the government had little trouble 
persuading Judge Cote that ebook sales had dropped. “Not surpris-
ingly,” she wrote, “the law of supply and demand were not sus-
pended for e-books. When the Publisher Defendants increased the 
prices of their e-books, they sold fewer books.”387
By applying the Chicago School cookie-cutter approach, gov-
ernment regulators, and the courts ignored critical features of the 
industry. They ignored that, from the publishers’ point of view, the 
381. Complaint, supra note 212, ¶ 27.
382. Apple Inc.’s Answer, supra note 218, at 2.
383. Bogus, The New Road to Serfdom, supra note 13, at 15–21.
384. Trial Transcript, United States v. Apple Inc., supra note 109, at 2587.
385. Id. at 2511–12; Apple Inc.’s Answer, supra note 218, at 1. Apple Inc. Apple also ar-
gued that prices did not rise. Apple argued that during the relevant time frame the average 
ebook price fell from $7.97 to $7.34. Throwing the Book at Apple, WALL STREET J. (June 12, 
2013, 7:08 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873240633045785254
54146561648.
386. Claire Cain Miller, E-Books Tops Hardcovers at Amazon, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2010)
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/20/technology/20kindle.html; see also Industry Sales Rose 
3.1% in 2010; Trade E-book Sales the Big Winner, PUBLISHERS WKLY. (Aug. 9, 2011), https://
www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/financial-reporting/article/48280-
industry-sales-rose-3-1-in-2010-trade-e-book-sales-the-big-winner.html (providing revenue fig-
ures rather than number of units sold however).
387. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 684.
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market was not ebooks but books. Publishers wanted to sell as 
many copies as possible of a particular title, and they wanted to be 
able to be indifferent about whether readers were choosing physi-
cal or ebook editions. They ignored the fact that if the publishers 
conspired, they conspired to make less rather than more money on 
ebooks. They ignored that books are not olive oil: Each book is 
unique, and books do not compete with one another the way fun-
gible products do. They ignored that publishers have little incen-
tive to fix prices because publishers compete with one another on 
authors and content and not so much with prices. They ignored 
that publishers do not produce ebooks quite the way manufactures 
produce physical products. Placing an ebook for sale online makes 
an unlimited quantity available; publishers do not decide to reduce 
production in order to increase price.
Focusing single-mindedly on the North Star of industry output 
and consumer prices was powerfully misleading in this case. Gov-
ernment regulators and the courts saw parties that wanted to raise 
the consumer price of ebooks. They also believed the parties col-
laborated toward that end. Certainly, the publishers did discuss 
among themselves their desires to raise the retail prices of ebooks, 
and five of them signed contracts with Apple that were designed to 
raise those prices. Since the regulators and judges viewed consum-
er prices as all-important, they unquestioningly assumed that low 
prices are good and any collaborative effort to raise them was an 
unlawful price-fixing conspiracy. However, the $9.99 price point 
was not merely a low price—it was a too-low price. It was not a price 
set through free market competition. It was not low because a sell-
er realized new efficiencies. It did not reflect the cost of produc-
tion; it was below the cost of production. The price was synthetical-
ly low because a party with enormous market power was seeking to 
concretize a retail monopoly in ebooks, and perhaps parlay that in-
to a retail monopoly in all books (not to mention even in publish-
ing books). Under the particular circumstances of this case, there 
was nothing nefarious, evil, or against the social welfare for pub-
lishers and Apple to collaborate, as they did, to raise ebook prices. 
Apple and the publishers acted in—not against—the public inter-
est.388
The result in this case would have horrified Louis Brandeis, who 
believed it essential to understand the industry in question. 
388. As Judge Cote saw it, consumers suffered in three ways: having to pay more for 
ebooks, making do with less expensive books they did not desire as much, or foregoing pur-
chases. Id. at 685.
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Brandeis almost certainly would have found for Apple.389 And a 
school of thought that teaches that everything that matters can be 
logically deduced from a few basic premises would have appalled 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, who famously wrote: “The life of the law 
has not been logic; it has been experience.”390
Surely many economists would also be horrified at the Chicago 
School’s highly reductionist and simplistic antitrust economics. As 
the old adage teaches, a little knowledge is dangerous. Economist 
James Kwak warns against “economism,” which he defines as “the 
belief that a few isolated Economics 101 lessons accurately describe 
the world.”391 He explains:
The key insights of the competitive market model . . . are 
deeply seductive to many people who share its secrets. This 
elegant framework promises to explain virtually all social 
phenomena with a handful of diagrams . . . . [But it’s] a lot 
easier to make a case in the abstract world of supply and 
demand curves than it is in the real world of people and in-
stitutions. That’s a major reason why economism is so wide-
spread and powerful. But it’s the real world that we live in, 
not a textbook. 
Because they were trained in a doctrine with such a narrow vi-
sion, government regulators and the courts were blind to the ele-
phant in the room: They saw the case as about the evils of higher 
prices and reduced industry output when they should have seen it 
as about the economic, social, and political consequences of con-
solidated corporate power.
“First do no harm,” Hippocrates taught. Government regulators 
and the courts should have heeded that advice in this case, but 
they did not. In United States v. Apple and related class action litiga-
tion, the court ordered Amazon to pay $450 million to consumers 
389. Brandeis’ biographer, Jeffrey Rosen, speculates that Brandeis may have wanted to 
check Amazon’s power and been sympathetic to publishers’ efforts to stop Amazon from 
using its monopoly power to sell ebooks below the price it paid for them. ROSEN, supra note
19, at 205. “For Brandeis,” writes Rosen, “book pricing should offer reasonable rewards for 
the individual creative author, not the giant distributor.” Id. at 206.
390. Holmes continued that the law must take account “[of] moral and political theo-
ries, intuitions of public policy” and much else, and “cannot be dealt with as if it contained 
only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE 
COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881).
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who, the court believed, had been overcharged for ebooks.392 More 
significantly, the court ordered publishers to terminate their con-
tracts with Apple and enjoined them from entering into new con-
tracts with an ebook retailer that contained MFN clauses or re-
stricted the retailer’s right to discount ebooks (as long as a retailer 
was not, in the aggregate, taking a loss on all of a publisher’s
ebooks).393 This largely restored things to the status quo ante bel-
lum. Today Amazon controls sixty-five percent of the retail ebook 
market and seventy-four percent of the ereader market.394 Sony, 
though in the market briefly, has stopped selling ereaders in the 
United States.395 Barnes & Noble has slashed funding on the Nook 
and laid off workers in its physical stores. Analysts are speculating
about whether Barnes & Noble will go out of business or be sold. 
Based on the Department of Justice and the courts’ actions, the 
publishers are surely not going to band together to try to resist the 
Amazon juggernaut.
CONCLUSION
There is renewed interest in antitrust law. It has become a popu-
lar subject of political speeches,396 newspaper columns,397 and a 
prominent plank in a new Democratic Party platform.398 While in-
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21, 2014), 2014 WL 11125070, at *3.
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terest is especially intense in progressive circles, the revived interest 
in antitrust spans the ideological spectrum. In the main, calls for 
reform advocate for more aggressively enforcing existing antitrust 
doctrine. This Article argues for something different: a paradigm 
shift in antitrust. Rather than being concerned exclusively with 
consumer welfare, antitrust law must also be concerned with the 
social and political—as well as economic—consequences of consol-
idated corporate power. 
Adherents of the current consensus will object that I am advo-
cating for a return to what they call “the bad old days.” By that they 
mean a time before the Chicago School brought supposed eco-
nomic objectivity and rigor to antitrust analysis—a time when, ac-
cording to Robert Bork, antitrust was “nothing more or less than 
judicial subjectivism.” Antitrust, they believe, is administrable with 
the single objective of enhancing consumer welfare, so long as 
“consumer welfare” is defined exclusively in terms of lower prices 
and increased output. But antitrust would not be sensibly admin-
istrable, according to the current consensus, if courts are asked to 
consider other economic matters, not to mention social and politi-
cal values, too. Regulators and courts will operate without a map 
and become lost. Court decisions will be driven by the personal 
views of judges rather than by neutral legal principles. That is what 
many fear.
The fears are not entirely without merit, but we need a new anti-
trust paradigm anyway. We have given up far too much for sup-
posed objectivity. The things we have given up are precious and 
fundamental. It is a bedrock principle of American democracy that 
too much power must never be consolidated in one place. We rely 
on constitutional law—which includes a rich jurisprudence on sep-
aration of powers, among other relevant areas—to guard against 
the dangers of consolidated governmental power. In the modern 
world, however, governments are not the only entities possessing 
great power. Corporations possess enormous power, as well. Anti-
trust needs to play a parallel role in guarding against the dangers 
of consolidated corporate power. Adherents of the current consen-
sus recoil at that suggestion. Protecting America against consoli-
dated corporate power is a worthy objective, they believe, but other 
fields of law should do that. To which one should ask: What other 
fields of law? As I have demonstrated with considerable evidence 
elsewhere, antitrust was designed to be the principal legal instru-
ment for protecting America against consolidated corporate pow-
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er. Its abdication of that responsibility is damaging America in 
many ways. 
It is no more possible for one person to develop a simple formu-
la for how antitrust must shoulder that responsibility than it is for 
one person to attempt a similar feat for constitutional law. The 
framers of our most important antitrust statutes—the Sherman 
Act, the Clayton Act, and Celler-Kefauver Act—understood that. 
They wrote broad principles, and they expected the courts, 
through common law adjudication, to develop doctrines in ac-
cordance with those principles and over time modify doctrine as 
necessary. That is how courts proceed in matters of constitutional 
law. There are, of course, great debates about constitutional law. 
Those debates take place everywhere: in law reviews and newspa-
pers; in high school classes, on college campuses, in in law schools; 
on political soapboxes and in congressional committees; on televi-
sion, radio, and throughout the Internet. On some level, all of that 
debate influences common law decision making. It affects how 
judges decide cases, as well as who becomes judges. It is a messy 
and uncertain process. That is how a democracy operates. Moreo-
ver, that is how a democracy should operate because fundamental 
societal values can never be the exclusive province of specialists.
Does accepting the premise that antitrust must consider consol-
idated corporate power make United States v. Apple a difficult case? 
This Article submits that it does not. The potential danger of hav-
ing one firm ultimately decide which books will be published or
visibly promoted in America is unacceptable. That danger far out-
weighs the benefits of low consumer prices—prices which, in fact, 
were not the product of free market competition but held at a syn-
thetically low level by a firm with a firm with a de facto monopoly.
United States v. Apple is one stark example of the fundamental 
values that are at stake.
